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Abstract
The U.S./Canadian border is in the process of being renegotiated
as a result of larger processes of redefining and reimagining sovereign
territories in North America. New understandings of U.S. and Canadian
state sovereignty are creating a conflated “other” of cross-border flows: an
illegitimate migrant figure who is securitized, criminalized and
disembodied. The contemporary “othering” of the migrant has serious
human rights implications such as the restriction of access to refugee
protection. U.S. and Canadian states share an agenda of migration
control executed through the manipulation of geography and the figure of
the migrant.
On paper, the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) aims to
enhance refugee protection and increase border security. In practice,
STCA makes the U.S./Canadian border a battleground for obtaining
access to asylum, thus eroding refugee protection in North America and
threatening the security of asylum seekers, the U.S. and Canadian states.
In order to evaluate STCA, I conducted field interviews during 2006
and 2007 with persons working in the U.S. and Canadian governments as
well as outside the governments in both countries on STCA. Through my
analysis of these discussions, official policy documents and relevant
literature, I offer three different readings of STCA. This provides a context
for STCA and uncovers the motivations for the signing of the policy.
The U.S./Canadian STCA functions as an exclusionary measure in
a broader field of exclusions: reconfigurations of the border, state
sovereignty, territorial limits of the state and the figure of the migrant which
aim to reduce the access to and the quality of asylum.
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- iii I leave you with the story of Charles, a Haitian refugee living in
Binghamton who was searching for his son in order to bring him to the
U.S. as a refugee through family reunification:

Me: I’m sorry we have not received any information on your son.

Charles: Thank you for your help. I will visit next week. God bless you!
God bless you!

Me: Are you worried about your son? The conflict is raging in Haiti. How
long have you been searching?

Charles: Oh, three years. I have not heard from him for three years. I
wonder everyday if I should wake up and come to this office to search
more. I wonder if he is alive. But I am a father, how can I give up?

-1Introduction: Contextualizing the Safe Third Country Agreement
Stretching over 4,000 miles of land, the U.S./Canadian border is the
longest undefended border in the world. According to the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), “among its many challenging natural features
are vast mountain ranges such as the Rockies, the Great Lakes, many
different river systems, and in the winter heavy snow and bitter cold
temperatures” (2). Two sovereign states with different political cultures
and understandings of sovereignty are working together to regulate the
border.
The U.S./Canadian border is in the process of being renegotiated
as a result of larger processes of redefining and reimagining sovereign
territories in North America. New understandings of U.S. and Canadian
state sovereignty are creating a conflated “other” of cross-border flows, an
illegitimate migrant figure who is securitized, criminalized and
disembodied (Bigo). The contemporary “othering” of the migrant has
serious human rights implications such as the restriction of access for
asylum seekers in need of refugee protection.
STCA is one policy that animates this renegotiation of sovereignty
by regulating the flow of asylum seekers through assertions of sovereign
power at the U.S./Canadian land border. On paper, STCA claims to
enhance refugee protection and to increase security in the U.S. and
Canada. In practice, STCA functions as a barrier and a deterrent for
persons seeking asylum in the U.S. or Canada. As a result, STCA

-2encourages asylum seekers to utilize informal channels to move across
the U.S./Canadian border (such as smuggling and trafficking) which
potentially decreases the security of individual asylum seekers and the
national security of the U.S. and Canada.
STCA is a piece of the Smart Border Accord (SBA), a bilateral
agreement between the U.S. and Canada that was signed in December
2001. The goals of SBA are to increase security and efficiency of
movement of cargo and people along the U.S./Canadian border. The
coupling of STCA and SBA is illogical; STCA focuses on refugee
protection and SBA focuses on national security issues. The odd couple
formed when the U.S. and Canadian governments bargained their
agendas during the post 9/11 political environment that favored policy
making in the name of security. The U.S. entered into the bilateral
agreement of STCA with Canada which served Canada’s agenda of
asylum flow reduction. In return, the U.S. received Canada’s cooperation
in border regulation through their signing onto the SBA.
The Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) was signed by the U.S.
and Canada in December of 2004. STCA distributes asylum flows
between the U.S. and Canada by requiring asylum seekers to make
claims in their first countries of arrival, before crossing the border. For
example, an asylum seeker succeeds in reaching the U.S. through
informal channels but plans to travel to Canada in order to claim asylum
will be screened and interviewed at the U.S./Canadian border and

-3required to make a claim through the U.S. asylum system. Essentially,
STCA diverts flows of asylum seekers at the U.S./Canadian land border
back to the asylum seeker’s country of “last presence”, the first “safe third”
country encountered.
Until STCA, asylum seekers who reached the U.S./Canadian land
border had the opportunity to claim asylum in either the U.S. or Canada.
Although the asylum seeker will be processed by either the U.S. or the
Canadian systems under the policy, STCA does not allow asylum seekers
to choose their country of asylum, a right that asylum seekers had enjoyed
prior to STCA’s implementation. In 2001, over half of the asylum seekers
who made claims in Canada first traveled through the U.S.
It is important to clarify that STCA only applies to land points of
entry (POEs). STCA is enacted at the U.S./Canadian land border but
does not apply to points of entry such as water ports or airports. If an
asylum seeker flies from the U.S. to Canada by airplane makes an asylum
claim in Canada, the conditions of STCA would not force her to return to
the U.S.

In November 2006, the U.S. Government, the Government of
Canada and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees released a
tripartite report, A Partnership for Protection, which evaluated the
implementation of STCA and the policy’s impact. The introduction of this
report offers insight into origins of safe third as a concept and explains the
regions that safe third country agreements were first implemented.
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International cooperation based on the principle of responsibility sharing
provides a basis for states to respond to these challenges, in part by providing for
the more orderly handling of refugee applications. To this end, developed
countries, including Canada and the U.S., have articulated a “Safe Third Country”
policy. The premise of this policy is that where a refugee claimant could have
previously sought protection in another safe country, it is reasonable and
appropriate to require the refugee claimant to return and make use of that
opportunity. (Partnership, Introduction)

Safe Third policies are founded on interpretations of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol by
states that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first “safe” country
they arrive in (UNHCR). Asylum seekers who pass through multiple “safe”
countries or apply for asylum in multiple countries are considered to be
“asylum shoppers”, a phrase commonly used by the U.S. and Canadian
governments to refer to asylum seekers. The excerpt below from the
Partnership introduction demonstrates that the safe third concept was
developed and implemented for the purpose of distributing asylum flow
processing, referred to above as “responsibility sharing”.

The European experience illustrates similar cooperation through responsibilitysharing efforts. Several European states, also faced with the serious challenges
described above, began to introduce the Safe Third Country concept into their
national legislation during the 1980s, including Switzerland (1979), Belgium
(1980) and Sweden (1989). In 1990, European Union states built on the original
1985 Schengen Agreement (related to the harmonization of border and visa
controls) first by amending Schengen to include criteria by which to assign
responsibility for adjudicating asylum applications to one—but only one —
participating state. The Dublin Convention, signed in Dublin, Ireland, on
June 15, 1990, replaced these Schengen provisions. The Dublin Convention built
on previous experience with use of the Safe Third Country concept in national
legislation to establish a multilateral framework of criteria to determine which
European Union member state would be responsible for adjudicating an asylum
claim, and required that state to accept the return of asylum seekers who had
moved to another member state and sought protection. Its underlying premise
was that all member states of the European Union could be considered as safe
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to refugee claims. (Partnership, Introduction)

In the discussion of safe third in the EU, the Schengen and Dublin
policies are often evoked. As described above, asylum seeker flows are
distributed across member states of the EU that are deemed “safe” for
asylum processing. The U.S./Canadian STCA is based on the European
concept of safe third but differs from the EU practice of safe third because
it is a bilateral agreement between two countries that are deemed “safe”:
the U.S. and Canada. It is outside the scope of this project to conduct an
in-depth analysis of the interpretation and application of “safe third
country” in the domestic laws of EU member states and the U.S. and
Canada; however these analyses would be necessary for a
comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of safe third country agreements
across the world.
Through this thesis, I offer an evaluation of the role of STCA in
shaping the U.S./Canadian border. I offer three analytical readings of the
policy: a literature analysis, a policy analysis and an analysis of interviews
with persons involved with STCA’s development and implementation.
In Chapter 1, I review literature relevant to the current debates
surrounding borders, sovereignty and refugee protection. I place STCA
within broader global and regional trends of asylum.
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of STCA as presented in official
policy documents, press releases, speeches and news articles. Please

-6refer to Appendix 1 for the final text of STCA. I aim to demonstrate how
the U.S. and Canadian governments wished STCA to be interpreted by
their respective publics.
In Chapter 3, I discuss my findings which draw on interviews with
more than 20 key informants from the government, the non-profit and
academic sectors in both Canada and the U.S.: Ottawa, Montreal,
Toronto, and Washington, DC. The goal of this field work was to
understand the motivations for the formation and signing of STCA while
evaluating the actual implementation process of the policy on both sides of
the border. I explore the difference between the official aims of STCA laid
out in Chapter 2 and the actual function of the policy as interpreted by
those who work on the many dimensions of STCA such as the policy’s
implementation and those who work with asylum seekers impacted by the
policy.
In the concluding chapter I summarize findings and the various
perspectives surrounding the formation, implementation and future of
STCA.

-7Chapter 1: (re)defining the post 9/11 border
This chapter presents current trends in international refugee
protection and defines new understandings of the border and sovereignty.
I will place STCA in the context of broader changes and argue that STCA
is one control mechanism in a large group of policies that aim to regulate
and reduce asylum flows (Hyndman and Mountz). Through the
application of STCA, the border between the U.S. and Canada has
become more of an obstacle and a deterrent to the asylum seeker
attempting to realize her asylum journey. The space of the border is a
battleground of STCA, where the geographical struggles of the asylum
seeker play out. Asylum seekers no longer can move between the U.S.
and Canada to make asylum claims in their country of choice which has
resulted in lower levels of protection and, in some cases, a denial of
protection for asylum seekers. I will discuss this claim further in chapter
two. First, I will analyze the trends in asylum regulation that are eroding
refugee protection in North America and will locate STCA among these
processes.
The review that follows is inherently incomplete since it provides a
snapshot of a continually changing border. The border is not only a line
on a map; it is a dynamic process. Additionally, I will discuss themes that
emerged during my field work that were not laid out in the literature.

The U.S./Canadian border steals the spotlight

-8Many authors such as Hristoulas, Andreas, Koslowski and Salter,
discussed the increase in attention placed on the U.S./Canadian border
following the events of 9/11, a manifestation of Canada being perceived
as a security threat to the U.S. It is important to note that Canada’s
refugee and immigration systems were perceived as “lenient” and were
cited as a major source of insecurity to the U.S. Hristoulas describes how
the “U.S. media has portrayed Canada as a hotbed for terrorist activity.
Special emphasis has been placed on Canada’s refugee laws…” (30).
Continuing Hristoulas’ discussion of post 9/11 threat perceptions, Andreas
presents a shift in U.S./Canadian border relations that occurred after 9/11:

The openness of the border, labeled ‘the world’s longest undefended border,’ has
traditionally been a source of mutual pride, but is now perceived and treated as a
source of vulnerability by the United States. Even though none of the 19
hijackers involved in the September 11th attacks entered across the border and in
fact had been issued visas by the United States, some U.S. media reports have
depicted Canada as a haven for terrorists who exploit Canada’s liberal refugee
and immigration system. (6)

Canadian border enforcement, or the lack of border enforcement,
was interpreted by the U.S. as a threat to security in the post 9/11 era.
Koslowski explains that Canada was perceived as a “sieve through which
terrorists could easily pass” after the events of 9/11 (2). The increased
attention on the threat posed by the U.S./Canadian border’s lack of
enforcement logically encouraged the development of restrictive border
policies. However, the U.S. and Canadian states did not wish to tighten
the border through measures that would be destructive to their lucrative
economic relationship as top trading partners.

-9Salter articulates the paradox discussed by many of the authors:
the need to facilitate trade between the U.S. and Canada while restricting
movement as a security precaution. “At different times since the 9/11
attacks, the U.S.-Canadian border has been variously represented as a
leaky backdoor into America and as a necessary trade link” (Salter,
Passports 82). The border cannot be closed because the trade
relationship between the U.S. and Canada is essential to the survival of
both economies. The U.S. is Canada’s number one trading partner and
Canada serves as the second largest importer of American goods.
Andreas describes the importance of the economic relationship
between the U.S. and Canada. As of 2003, “The United States and
Canada conduct $1.3 billion worth of two-way trade a day, most of which
is moved by truck across the border. Forty-thousand commercial
shipments and 300,000 people cross the 4,000-mile-long U.S.-Canada
border every day” (Andreas 7).
The struggle for openness and restrictiveness plays out at the
border. Andreas presents the contradictory desires of the liberal nationstate: the desire to keep the border “open for business” and closed to
security threats, explaining that during the NAFTA era, “the border had
become both more blurred and more sharply demarcated than ever
before” (3). The U.S. and Canadian states wish to facilitate economic
flows while preventing flows that may threaten the state such as the
movements of terrorists.

- 10 In order to develop border policies that respond to these seemingly
contradictory demands, the U.S. and Canadian governments are
attempting to strike a balance (perhaps an unattainable goal) between free
movement for economic benefit and restricted movement in the name of
security. The struggle persists.

Renegotiating the U.S./Canadian border post 9/11
In order to satisfy demands for openness to trade and heightened
security, the border is being renegotiated. Since the U.S./Canadian
border is under the microscope of government and media scrutiny, how is
the border changing? Through my study of literature on emerging border
trends, primary and secondary sources, I have learned that this line on the
map is undergoing a makeover, a process that will not likely be completed
for years to come, if at all. Therefore, it is important to study the border in
order to analyze what is happening as it is happening, in the hopes of
influencing outcomes and shaping the new look of the border.
Pauly proposes the ideal border that would balance trade and
security, “to reconstruct a physical and psychological border with the
United States, one that would keep out as many problems as possible,
while still allowing in as many opportunities as Canadians agreed were
attractive. Neither high barriers nor open bridges would do. The new
border had to be marked by a unique kind of fence.” (93)

- 11 While there is a literary consensus over the fact that the border is
undergoing a facelift, there are contradictory descriptions of the “new”
border, what the “unique fence” would look like. How are the struggles of
openness and restrictiveness constructing or deconstructing the border? I
argue that the post 9/11 border triages flows into two groupings: desired
and undesired. The U.S. and Canadian states execute the deflection and
facilitation through the blurring of regimes associated with the border and
through the literal act of moving the border.
Andreas offers a look at the renegotiation process occurring in the
U.S./Canadian and U.S./Mexican borders.

…borders are very much back in style. Rather than simply being dismantled in
the face of intensifying pressures of economic integration, border controls are
being re-tooled and redesigned as part of a new and expanding ‘war on
terrorism’…Traditional border issues such as trade and migration are now
inescapably evaluated through a security lens. (1)

Andreas’ border supports my argument of the blurring of categories at the
border, a border that triages flows on the basis of security into those who
are legal and those who are illegal. The conflation of all border uses into
security considerations diverts focus away from the important
considerations of human security and refugee protection.
In addition to the trend of “blurring” categories of cross-border flows
(Bigo), many authors discussed the trend of states moving the border
away from its traditional location through the processes of
transnationalizing, externalizing (Guiraudon and Joppke), borders existing

- 12 elsewhere (Zureik and Salter), pushing the borders out (Flynn), and
delocalizing (Salter), in order to address security concerns. New
understandings of U.S. and Canadian sovereignty are redefining the
territorial limits of North America as a region. States are manipulating the
border by moving it away from the line on the map; to regulate flows
before they reach the border. Borders now occur anywhere the state
deems to be a border site. Zureik and Salter discuss the manipulation of
traditional definitions of sovereign territory:

The borders of the state need no longer be confined to traditional points of entry
which travelers, citizens, immigrants and other transient groups are accustomed
to pass through- legally or illegally. Borders now exist elsewhere, so to speak, in
places that traditionally belonged to sovereign states, but now have been
transformed to enable governments to check across their geographic borders
personal identity and monitor the movement of people before such movement
actually takes place. (9)

STCA does not fall under these processes of moving the border.
However, STCA functions as a deterrent and part of the fortification of
U.S./Canadian boundaries. The above trends strengthen and restrict
entrance to the U.S. and Canada away from the land border where STCA
functions. These various points of fortification are related in that they
deter and at times exclude asylum seekers from reaching the U.S. or
Canada. Outside of the practical functions of these processes, the
deployment of tactics to strengthen and move borders gives context to the
goals of the U.S. and Canadian states to reduce flows of unwanted
migrants, a category of potential security threats that asylum seekers are
often placed under by nation-states. Under STCA, the asylum seekers

- 13 who reach the U.S. and Canadian land border will have the opportunity to
go through asylum processing in one of the countries. These trends serve
to probe a broader agenda of exclusion that prevents or deters asylum
seekers from traveling to North America, thus not interacting with STCA at
all.
Mirroring Flynn’s argument of pushing borders out, Salter notes that
one policy initiative of the U.S. is “a distancing of the discriminating and
policing function away from the actual site of the international border”
(Salter, Passports 75). Salter argues that “the border is not just a line, but
a network of POEs that accommodate the global transportation grid. It is
better to speak of the ‘border function’ than of lines in the sand” (Salter,
Passports 80). While STCA functions as a deterrent to asylum seekers in
North America and in their home or host countries away from the region,
asylum seekers may be deterred by interactions with the U.S. and
Canadian states in various points across the globe (Mountz). How is the
moving the location of the border away from the traditional border site
serving the U.S. and Canadian states? By processing people away from
sovereign territory, states can stem the undesired flows or facilitate the
movement of persons who are desired. When reviewed in the context of
STCA, these trends offer new research directions on how many persons
are not reaching North America to make claims because they are deterred
or prevented from traveling.

- 14 Hristoulas describes how continental and border security is being
redefined, “rethinking how borders are conceived…Canada, Mexico, and
the United States law enforcement agencies would work more closely
together away from the physical frontiers to reduce the need for inspection
at the borders themselves” (32). Guiraudon and Joppke discuss the
“externalizing” of border controls in order to prevent migration (13). They
cleverly refer to these multi-site control tactics as “remote control” (14).
States assert power over migratory flows at multiple sites and on multiple
scales around the globe. Now, more than ever, the border is being
renegotiated to exist away from its line on the map. While it is difficult to
measure how many potential refugees are deterred or prevented from
reaching North America, I believe it is imperative to question the extent of
the reduction of access to North America in relation to STCA. The policy
of STCA redistributes flows between the U.S. and Canada but why are the
overall numbers of asylum seekers in North America decreasing? Some
may be deterred by STCA while others are may be deterred by these
globalized policing practices of the U.S. and Canadian states.

Sovereignty and mobile bodies
Since the renegotiating of the border is a manifestation of the
reimaginings of state sovereignty by the U.S. and Canadian state actors, it
is important to pick up where Scott left off in his project, calling for the
investigation of “why the state has always seemed to be the enemy of

- 15 ‘people who move around’” (1). How are assertions of sovereign power
over persons on the move serving the state? Regulation of movement is
essential to the sovereign identity of the state (Nyers). As the state aims
to protect those within its borders, the state securitizes and criminalizes
migration as a means of controlling those who attempt to enter or may
attempt to enter the state territory.
STCA is a policy that sweepingly criminalizes and securitizes
asylum seekers. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the safe third
country agreements were first implemented in Europe to prevent “asylum
shopping”, the act of asylum seekers passing through multiple countries
which are considered to be “safe” countries to make asylum claims or
asylum seekers making claims in multiple countries. While this act of
“asylum shopping” is employed by many asylum seekers as a means to
obtain the highest level of protection or in some cases, as a survival
strategy, the U.S. and Canadian states view the exercise as an abuse by
non bona fide refugees to their asylum processing systems. STCA returns
asylum seekers to the first country in North America the asylum seeker
passed through, preventing asylum seekers from accessing the system
that may be in their best interests of protection.
Bigo describes the securitization of immigration as a way for the
state to exercise sovereignty. Bigo presents Scott’s “seeing like a state”,
the ways the state views itself and others. “Securitization of the immigrant
as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container
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symbolic control over territorial boundaries” (Bigo, Unease 65). The state
defines itself at territorial limits through the regulation of migrant bodies.
Similarly, Hyndman and Mountz present the perspective of states, “asylum
seekers and undocumented migrants embody insecurity by testing the
porosity of political borders” (80). The state forces the migrant to embody
insecurity by disembodying the migrant of its natural representation of
human rights, democracy, and humanitarianism. Asylum seekers and
refugees traverse to the U.S. and Canada to escape persecution and to
enjoy the protection offered by these democratic states. The state views
the mobile migrant body as a security threat. Salter discuss the mobile
body as being, “…regarded in the same light as a criminal or as a victim of
an epidemic: his mere physical presence increases the risk of violence’”
(Salter, Threshold 38).
In particular, asylum seekers embody insecurity because they are
viewed by states as illegally mobile bodies. Asylum seekers who pass
through multiple “safe” countries are criminalized by the STCA, since they
are forced to return to their last safe country of presence. Walters offers
another perspective on the relationship between security and movement:
“Insecurity is bound up with themes of mobility: it is the movement, the
circulation, the presence of unauthorized bodies which have violated the
borders of the nation-state” (Walters, Domopolitics 247). Crosby
discusses this criminalization of the asylum seeker: “The expression

- 17 ‘forum shopping’ connotes the idea that choosing the country of asylum is
essentially an opportunistic abuse of the international regime of refugee
protection.” (6) In theory, STCA attempts to eliminate the “abuse” of
asylum seekers exercising a preference in their protection. In practice, the
U.S. and Canadian governments currently have no method for measuring
how STCA is achieving this aim.
States securitize and criminalize the mobile body as a means to
reinforce their sovereignty. Through STCA, the U.S. and Canadian states
usurp the ability of asylum seekers to exercise their agency at the U.S.
and Canadian land border. Nyers illustrates the relationship between
state sovereignty and asylum seekers by describing the use of the
‘foreigner’ as a means to execute a “national (re)founding” (1076).
“Whenever a state ponders whether or not to grant asylum to an
individual, it is making an intervention in the politics of protection. This is a
significant political issue because the capacity to decide upon matters of
inclusion and exclusion is a key element of sovereign power” (1071).
In what ways is sovereign power asserted over the mobile body?
States exercise sovereign control over migration flows through the
manipulation of geography. International refugee law does not provide
asylum seekers with a defined right to enter a country to claim asylum but
does grant the right to seek asylum. Penz presents the restricted rights of
asylum seekers:

- 18 One such right is a right to asylum, in the form of a prohibition of the forced return
of those who have reached foreign territory and can claim individual persecution
(non-refoulement). It is a limited right, because it does not include a clear right to
entry and does not apply to other forms of victimization, such as by general
rather than specifically targeted violence. (46)

States exploit the geographies of asylum by intercepting asylum
flows outside of sovereignty territory making it difficult for asylum seekers
to claim asylum (Hyndman and Mountz). The international refugee
protection regime has yet to define and monitor obligations for states
performing interdiction and deflection away from their traditional territorial
limits. What rights do asylum seekers have in the grey zones of state
control? Nyers discusses the “mezzanine spaces of sovereignty – that is,
those spaces which are in-between the inside and the outside of the state”
(1080). Territory is deemed by the sovereign state to be non-sovereign
territory for its benefit. Hyndman and Mountz explain that “the refugee
crisis moves into sovereign territory, which in turn is converted to nonsovereign territory” (85).
As long as the denial of access to asylum occurs away from the
sovereign territory, states are able to mask their dwindling support for the
institution of asylum. On paper, states have committed to international
and domestic agreements that acknowledge the humanitarian need for
refugee protection. However, in practice, states are reducing access to
the protection that can be a matter of life or death for the asylum seeker.
Gibney summarizes the contradictions surrounding the institution of
asylum: “A kind of schizophrenia seems to pervade Western responses to

- 19 asylum seekers and refugees; great importance is attached to the
principle of asylum but enormous efforts are made to ensure that refugees
(and others with less pressing claims) never reach the territory of the state
where they could receive its protection” (2). Regardless of the high value
placed on asylum by states, in practice, Western states are reducing
access to refugee protection.
STCA serves to close off Canada or the U.S. to the asylum seeker
coming from the other side. By closing off regions of sovereign territory
and interacting with flows before they touch sovereign soil, states are
reinforcing their sovereign identities. According to Hyndman and Mountz:
“The North American Safe Third Country Agreement represents a different
architecture of enmity, a fortification to exclude the dangerous other
whose exclusion fortifies sovereignty of the states involved” (90).
Sovereignty is “fortified” through the exclusion of whom?

Reconfiguring the migrant “other”
How are new imaginations of sovereignty reconfiguring the
undesired cross-border flow, the migrant “other”? What does the “other”
of the border look like? The securitization and criminalization blurs the
“other” into a homogenous threat to state security (Bigo). The blurring of
the “other” disembodies distinct migrants who were the asylum seeker, the
economic migrant, the terrorist, the criminal, the smuggler and the
trafficker into an undefined person on the move who threatens the state.
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under the “migrant” category and then criminalized as “asylum shoppers”
when they are identified as asylum seekers.
The nation-state asserts its sovereignty over the “other” and
manipulates the visibility of the “other’s” figure in order to reinforce
sovereignty and justify state policies. Bigo defines the new “other” of the
contemporary border. Bigo describes the “immigrant” as the foreign being
that is invading the “body” of the state. (Bigo, Unease 67) Bigo explains
the utility of the word “immigrant” by describing its broad and
heterogeneous meaning. “Immigrant” can encompass any person or
population that the state desires to present as a security risk. Bigo’s
analysis of the use of the broad category of “immigrant” by the state
supports my argument that the categories of the undesired migrant are
blurring into one because it is more useful for the state to have an
undefined enemy, thus applicable to all who are illegally en route.
The all encompassing “immigrant” of Bigo is highlighted by
Hyndman and Mountz who discuss the “….increasingly blurred distinction
among suspected criminals, terrorists, and refugee claimants. Since 9/11,
but starting well before, migrants have come to stand in for all that
threatens state security and welfare…” (78). The aim to reduce “abuses”
in the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems through STCA shifts the focus
from the human rights needs of the asylum seeker to the presumed
security threat and illegality of the asylum seekers’ movement.
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who moves for purposes that are interpreted as beneficial to the states.
The U.S. and Canadian states aim to facilitate cross-border flows of
persons who are formally employed in the U.S. and Canada and to
encourage tourism in North America. Crosby lists these binaries of
desired and undesired flows: such as “illegal/legal,
documented/undocumented, political/economic” (3). STCA contributes to
the formation of these binaries, pitting refugee agency against the agency
of the state by forcefully redirecting flows of asylum seekers who would
“abuse” the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems by exercising a
preference.
I return to Nyers who discusses the types of migrants that are
discriminated against and cast as undesired by the states:

Asylum seekers, refugees, non-status residents, undocumented workers, socalled ‘over-stayers’ and ‘illegals’ – together, they have come to constitute a kind
of ‘abject class’ of global migrants. Whatever their designation, these migrants
are increasingly cast as the objects of securitized fears and anxieties, possessing
either an unsavoury agency (ie they are identity-frauds, queue jumpers, people
who undermine consent in the polity) or a dangerous agency (ie they are
criminals, terrorists, agents of insecurity). (1070)

The reconfiguration process of the undesired migrant is creating a
Nyers’ “abject class” of cross-border flows. The migration policies of the
European Union such as the Schengen Agreement triage flows into
desired and undesired just as the U.S./Canadian border is now executing.
The danger of policies such as STCA is that asylum seekers are
perceived as threats before they are recognized as those in need of
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discussing the transnational “threats” of people who move and how they
are perceived as homogenously dangerous:

A security field has been assembled through elite and public discourse which
brings together crime, drugs, asylum seekers, human smugglers, terrorists, and
so on, as though their association were quite natural. …This association of
refugees with crime, drugs, and terrorism, and their distancing from discourses of
democracy, human security, and human rights have been powerfully contested
by domestic and international groups such as Amnesty International and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (Walters, Mapping 570)

Migrants who once represented multiple motivations for movement such
as economic need, the need for asylum protection or for personal reasons
(or a mixture of all), are conflated into a singular “other” who embodies
insecurity. Under STCA, asylum seekers are placed in the “other”
category and many remain there unless their asylum claims are accepted
by the U.S. or Canada.
Some bureaucrats themselves view the migrant “other” as having
one face, one category, or as Heyman writes, “a one-dimensional other”
(268). In an interview with one of the directors of an Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) district, Heyman described this person’s view
of the migrant as “aliens appeared as an anonymous liquid flow that
constantly threatened to seep through holes in INS dikes and pour into the
interior of the United States” (268). The training of U.S. and Canadian
border agents is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is an area of
investigation relevant to understanding the domination of security
responses to cross-border flows.
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undesired migrant convenient to the state? An undefined migrant “other”
allows states to have broad, uniform border policies that do not require the
resources and training to separate the terrorist from the asylum seeker.
The state can more readily deny access if the person without papers at
the border is a presupposed security threat before considering the
possibility of the person needing asylum. Some potential asylum seekers
may be removed because they do not or are not identified as asylum
seekers because of profiling by border patrol, language barriers or cultural
issues. The U.S. and Canadian states are looking through a security lens
which is making it difficult for them to see asylum seekers.
Walters speaks to the convenience of an undefined “other” and the
state desires of simplicity:

Never mind this complex interrelation of the political and the economic in the
production of exodus. Nor that the decision to pack one’s bags and move
thousands of miles facing all sorts of life-threatening risks in the process is never
made lightly. If this complex reality doesn’t fit our moral categories, we’ll make it.
We’ll filter the white noise of multiple mobilities and establish clear ‘routes’ and
‘channels’. If we can just identify the genuine refugee, or the high-skilled
migrant, this will allow us to deal with the others, the ‘bogus’ with greater
confidence from the public and thus with more firmness. Just as with the old
poor law, we’ll send the undeserving and the illegitimate on their way. The
difference is the next parish is no longer just down the road. Instead, it’s a
specially-chartered plane-trip to the nearest applicable ‘safe third country’ or
most recent ‘country of transit’. (Walters Domopolotics 249)

The simplicity of ‘us’ and ‘them’ creates two groups: the desired
flows and the dangerous flows. STCA is a policy that reinforces this
binary by employing a simplistic triage approach. The simplification,
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rights and protection implications such as mistreatment and denial of
access.

Manipulating the (in)visibility of the migrant “other”
What measures are employed to control the migrant “other”
through STCA? STCA reduces the visibility of the asylum seeker by
discouraging formal border movements; those who go or remain
“underground” are less visible. Simultaneously, STCA gives the image of
false security by executing high-profile crackdowns. These moments of
insecurity are used to justify policies that heighten border enforcement
(Nevins). This method achieves two goals: to discourage flows before
they happen and to give an impression of national security. Essentially,
the figure of the migrant “other” is manipulated and deployed by states in
order to serve state agendas of security and exclusion (Mountz).
For example, Colombian refugees and Ecuadoran migrants whom I
worked with in an Ecuadorian migrant assistance office asked me if they
would be able to reach Canada with the new border policy, STCA. The
policy was viewed by potential migrants and asylum seekers, in Ecuador,
as a barrier, serving as a deterrent. Border regulation produces visible
events such as high-profile crackdowns that make the image of the border
appear safe and efficiently managed, placebos of security. However,
border regulation does not increase the security of the border environment
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making informal cross border activities invisible in order to offer a false
image of security.
STCA serves to manipulate the visibility of the migrant in order to
give images of insecurity and security at the border that will advance U.S.
and Canadian policies. I agree with Andreas that heightening border
regulation increases illegal movements and pushes these movements out
of visibility. The border appears to be more secure because the increase
in illegal activity becomes invisible. Andreas presents the success of the
“high visibility” border campaigns in making the border appear to be more
secure or “more under control” by explaining that “Illegal crossers were
pushed out of sight (into more remote deserts and mountains) and
therefore out of the media spotlight and the public’s mind” (5).
Bigo discusses the “refusal” of the state to “accept that immigration
is now out of their control generates an inflation of coercive discourse that
masks the fact that they are playing more with symbols than with effective
measures” (Bigo, Migration 125). Border control offers symbolic
representations of security to mask the increasing insecurity of the border.
Those excluded by border policies become invisible. Hyndman and
Mountz build on their discussion of the disembodied migrant figure as a
security threat by offering the increasing invisibility of the “refugee”
through the employment of “states of exception”, “making it possible to
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to erase the refugee from the immigrant-receiving Western state” (86).
The decreasing visibility of the asylum seeker under STCA has
human rights implications such as asylum seekers being abused by
smugglers and traffickers, services utilized since legal channels to move
between the U.S. and Canada are eliminated by STCA. STCA gives the
false image of security for asylum seekers in the U.S (Nadig, Koser). and
Canada. However, those remaining undocumented and becoming less
visible may not receive the protection they need. Crosby calls for
increasing the visibility of the invisibles of containment: “We need to move
away from a triage approach and instead embrace a construct that allows
us to make visible and include all those who are affected and made
vulnerable by containment policies” (11). There is a perpetual struggle
between the state and migrant of visibility, as migrants exercise their
agency. Nyers explained that migrants execute “sovereign (re)takings” by
making themselves visible in a system that wants them to be invisible
(1086). States and migrants are fighting blow for blow over inclusion and
exclusion.
The increase in attention on the U.S./Canadian border has distorted
the realities of “safety” and “security” of the border. By making border
enforcement policies such as STCA more visible, STCA makes crossborder movements less visible, deterring and discouraging formal
movements of asylum seekers. Zureik and Salter argue that “there has
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the terror attacks of 9/11, but the amount of public attention and policy
scrutiny has increased” (48). I contend that there have been significant
changes to the border during the post 9/11 era. The events of 9/11 set in
motion a number of policies that had incubated for years prior. These
policies are reconfiguring and restructuring the border. Both the policies
and the image of safety constructed by the states are destructive to the
interests of those migrating and those within the U.S. and Canada. STCA
threatens the security of the asylum seeker and of the U.S. and Canadian
states. There is no evidence that STCA is increasing security. There is
less protection offered and an increasingly insecure environment created
by the policies and manipulations of visibility.

Europeanizing North American control
Outside of North America, there are models of these regulatory
practices of the migrant. There is much to be learned about the
renegotiations of borders in North America by reviewing the renegotiations
occurring in Europe. The EU served first as an incubator and second as a
model for North American migration policies. Many authors have
discussed an “Europeanization” of the U.S./Canadian border and North
American migration control strategies including, Guiraudon and Joppke,
Andreas, Walters, Abell, and Clarkson, as being part of a broad agenda of
containment among Western states.
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immigration has quickly moved to the top of Western states’ immigration
control agenda, and it provides the main impetus to the
supranationalization of immigration policy in the European Union…” (7).
Canada and the U.S. are attempting to define a security perimeter that
closes their combined territories off to undesired migration. This
supranationalization process is modeled after the EU, when states joined
together to open their borders internally to trade and to deflect flows at the
external borders of Europe as a region. In his section on “Future Border
Trajectories”, Andreas describes North America

…multilateral policy harmonization and a ‘pooling’ of sovereignty to build a formal
North American security perimeter (a ‘fortress North America’). Such a path
would represent a Europeanization of border controls and thus a qualitative
transformation of the continental integration project. (12)

Walters discusses the purpose of the EU perimeter, formed by the
Schengen Agreement, “…Schengen does not appear to be connected
with a politics of war and peace, of geographical territory understood as a
power resource” (Walters, Mapping 562). Power for what purpose?
Power to exclude persons on the move?
One question that emerged from my review of the literature
surrounding Europeanization was: how does the ideal model of migration
control uphold or undermine international refugee protection? To what
standards is harmonization adhering to or aiming for? Which state
practices are considered to be best and exemplary? Abell calls for Canada
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that would not result in the “lowest common denominator’ for Canada, but
in higher standards for the United States” (587).
Contrasting the U.S. government and media opinions, Clarkson
presents the Canadian system as being “safer” than the U.S. immigration
system: “Full policy harmonization would also weaken Canadian refugee
and immigration procedures that had proved more effective at monitoring
terrorist s than had those of their American counterparts” (78). Clarkson
cites a quote from his interview with Janet Dench who deems the
“exporting U.S. practices and North-Americanizing the insecurity that
characterized American society” as dangerous to Canada (78).
Common practices and harmonization can decrease the quality of
protection by executing a “race to the bottom” of refugee protection. The
pressures circulated between the EU states, the U.S. and Canada
encourage policies of exclusion that make these territorial regions less
accessible and less appealing to potential refugees in search of safe
haven.
Abell presents the refugee protection gaps that have resulted from
EU safe third country provisions:

…the EU system has resulted in the ‘lowest common denominator’ in that each
EU country is trying to be more strict than its neighbor. If conditions in one EU
member state are not favorable for asylum seekers, there is the belief they will try
to reach another EU member state instead where they will probably be
recognized as refugees, leading to a higher number of asylum applications for
that same country. This thinking has resulted in stricter refugee procedures in all
of the member countries of the European Union. (588)
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similar ways to the EU STCA, given that the EU was the model for North
America. The signing of STCA can be contextualized within this trend of
Europeanization. Abell discusses how Canada followed the EU model.
Not only did Canada follow the EU model, Canada felt pressure from the
EU to implement a Safe Third policy, and then pressured the U.S. to sign.
Abell argues that “Canada has not been immune to the developments in
the European Union, and its immigration policies towards refugee
determination have changed accordingly” (570). Since Western states
harbor a fear of being overrun with by masses of asylum seekers, the
states aim for high levels of exclusion in order to look less appealing to
asylum seekers.
Abell describes the pressure experienced by the Canadian state:
…there was a belief that Canada’s fair and open determination system would not
be able to cope with the pressures generated by the diminution of asylum
opportunities in Europe. Canada was seen as having no choice then but to
adopt similar protectionist policies to the ones in place in the European Union…
(576)

States recognize the value of geography and are aware that asylum
seekers use geography to respond to restrictive policies. In order to avoid
flows of asylum seekers transferring from one region to another, states
cooperate with other states to tighten their common borders. Canada is
geographically isolated from land migration flows except for its southern
territorial limit that is shared with the U.S. STCA serves as a way for
Canada to fortify its territory to reduce asylum flows.
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STCA: deterring and denying access
How does the literature support the argument that STCA is a
control that achieves exclusion through geography? Hyndman and
Mountz propose that STCA and “…other restrictive measures designed to
thwart the arrival of asylum seekers, conveniently exploit Canada’s
geography to lessen the perceived burden of receiving refugees. This
agreement is but one of many that together fortify borders and acts of
sovereignty through exclusion” (82). Under STCA, Canada is closed off to
asylum seekers who attempt to reach Canadian territory via the land
border.
Crosby places STCA among the regulatory practices of the state:

Since the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift from
policies committed to resettlement as a permanent solution to refugee crises, as
outlined in the Geneva Convention, to policies aimed at containing refugee
populations in the regions where crises occur – essentially, the ‘not in my
backyard’ syndrome. These containment policies include strategies of diversion
and deflection (for example, safe third country agreements and transit-processing
zones), deterrence (detention of asylum applicants, denial of access to
employment), and, increasingly, prevention of movement altogether. (6)

STCA has advanced the agenda of the U.S. and Canadian states of
restricting access to asylum seekers. STCA is a policy of control and
deterrence that is part of a broad range of policies that erode refugee
protection in North America. The processes of redefining and reimagining
U.S. and Canadian sovereignties are causing migrants to struggle at
various border battlegrounds (wherever the state deems a border) from an
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with STCA at the battleground of the U.S./Canadian land border and are
directly redistributed by the U.S. and Canadian states. Those asylum
seekers who do not interact directly with STCA at the U.S./Canadian land
border may be deterred or prevented form reaching North America by
interactions with the U.S. and Canadian states at processing points
around the globe through mechanisms of interdiction and interception.
Outside of direct or indirect interactions with the U.S. and Canadian
states, asylum seekers may be deterred from traveling to North America
due to their ideological interaction with STCA; they are discouraged from
travel because STCA is interpreted as an obstacle to realizing their
asylum journeys. Nyers presented the exclusionary function of STCA.
“These agreements act in ways that reverse the flows of established
transnational migratory paths, turning them into transnational corridors of
expulsion” (1070).
Nyers, Crosby, and Hyndman and Mountz support my argument
and concern that Safe Third rejects its official aims of enhancing refugee
protection by serving as a policy of control as part of a broad range of
exclusionary measures such as interdiction and interception. These
policies are restricting access to refugee protection in North America by
closing off pieces of sovereign territory to asylum flows.

Summarizing the post 9/11 border
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America? Defining the new understandings of the border and sovereignty
with 9/11 as a benchmark is useful. It serves to contextualize the
changing border and state in the well defined post 9/11 era, when “post
9/11” is a phrase of powerful currency. However, 9/11 did not initiate the
development of new ideas for migration regulation, but set in motion
policies that were conceived decades prior. Ackleson describes 9/11 as a
“focusing event” that provided the political impetus for the signing of the
Smart Border (150). The post 9/11 border refers to a time period more
than an era of new ideas and projects.
Just as U.S. and Canadian agendas of exclusion have operated for
years, we can expect U.S. and Canadian border policies to advance
agendas of exclusion into the foreseeable future. Gibney summarizes a
forecast of exclusion: “There will be no let up in the tight control currently
exercised over asylum in the years ahead. …the events of that fateful
September day will ensure that any future attempts to liberalise asylum
policy are likely to founder on the rocks of preserving the security of US
citizens” (Gibney 165).
While the forecast of refugee protection in North America is bleak, I
believe there is hope for a more inclusionary approach in the future. I
argue that receiving asylum seekers is in the national interest of the U.S.
and Canadian states. Since STCA has not yet enhanced the security of
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demand attention and U.S. and Canadian state action.
There were a number of issues raised in my field work issues that
were not addressed by the literature. These topics include: the
relationship between SBA and STCA, the binary of refugee and state
agency, the impact of STCA on specific populations such as Haitians and
Colombians, the concept of a “safe” country and the competing agendas
within governments that influence migration control. I will discuss these
issues in Chapter 3.
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In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate the contradictions between the
officially stated goals of the U.S. and Canadian governments contained
within the final text of STCA and the practices actually pursued. When I
first read the final text of STCA, I was perplexed. How would a regulatory
policy achieve its stated goal of enhancing refugee protection? Through
my analysis of policy documents, I show that some of the official aims of
STCA are not achieved and that the implementation of STCA has resulted
in an erosion of asylum protection in North America.
The final text of STCA states responsibility sharing and cooperation
on managing flows as the goals of STCA. In contrast, other government
documents and various sources demonstrate that the reduction of asylum
flows is the desired outcome of STCA and in the interest of the U.S. and
Canadian governments.
In the final text of STCA the U.S. Government and Canadian
Government present STCA as a bilateral agreement for sharing
responsibility: “emphasizing that the United States and
Canada…committed to the notion that cooperation and burden-sharing
with respect to refugee status claimants can be enhanced…” Before the
implementation of STCA, the many asylum seekers traveled through the
U.S. to make their claims in Canada. According to UNHCR, in 2001, “over
14,000 people applied for asylum in Canada at a US-Canada land border.
This compares to about 200 people who applied for asylum on the US

- 36 side of the border. In general, it is estimated that over half of all of
Canada’s asylum claims (both at the border and inland) are made by
people who transited through the US” (1).
The official text of STCA states the aim as sharing the “burden” of
refugee claimant flows. In practice, the agreement serves to reduce the
flow, not to “share” the flow of asylum seekers. The reduction of flows is
not an accidental outcome of STCA. In contrast to the language used in
the final text of STCA, the Canadian Government has expressed its
wishes to reduce flows in North America in documents such as Citizenship
and Immigration Canada’s (CIC) Annual Report to Parliament on
Immigration for 2005. Excerpts from the report blatantly applaud the
reduction of asylum flows into Canada. A decrease in numbers of asylum
claimants is deemed a “positive results.”

Many recent administrative measures have yielded positive results in the form of
reduced intake and reduced inventories in some parts of the system. Intake for
2005 is projected to be a 15-year low at less than 20,000. Intake is lower, due in
part to a worldwide drop in refugee claims, and in part to measures that aim to
reduce the number of asylum claims made within Canada from individuals who
do not always have a genuine need for protection. With a drop in asylum claims,
CIC can ensure that the limited resources available are directed at those most in
need of protection. By June 2005, the IRB inventory had been reduced by more
than half to 22,000, compared to a high of 51,600 in 2002. (CIC, Parliament 35)

As a policy, STCA does not provide a mechanism to determine
whether persons seeking asylum in Canada who are deflected to the U.S.
under STCA eligibility requirements are genuine or non-bona fide
refugees. Without an assessment of the potential asylum seekers
deflected to the U.S., the Canadian Government makes a hollow claim
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protection. The threshold screening interview conducted by the U.S. and
Canadian border patrol agents merely adjudicates eligibility for asylum in
the U.S. or Canada on the basis of STCA; it does not inquire as to why
asylum seekers wish to make claims in Canada over the U.S. or vice
versa. Abell describes the threshold screening interview: “The potential or
experienced persecution of the asylum seeker is not considered in the
threshold screening interview for Safe Third. Cases are not adjudicated
on an individual basis, but rather people are assigned countries” (579).
Regarding the drop in refugee claims worldwide, the Canadian
Government fails to acknowledge that there are potential refugees who
are not able to or discouraged from accessing asylum across the globe;
some asylum seekers may avoid formal systems due to fears of
deportation or their mobility has been restricted in a way that prevents
them from reaching a safe country to make asylum claims.
STCA is a policy of migration control that redistributes flows of
asylum seekers between the U.S. and Canada. However, the CIC’s
discussion of the 15 year low of asylum claims during STCA’s first year of
implementation is significant in that it demonstrates the redistribution of
asylum flows from Canada to the U.S. and potentially beyond both
countries. Persons who hoped to seek asylum in Canada were either
processed in the U.S. system or were deterred from traveling to the
U.S./Canadian border formally. It is difficult to measure how many
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resultantly remained undocumented in the U.S., utilized informal channels
of migration to cross the U.S./Canadian border, or remained in home or
transit countries outside of North America. Later in this chapter I will
discuss the implications of Canada’s deflection of asylum seekers to the
U.S. and the gravity of the fifty percent decrease of asylum claimants to
Canada from the U.S. between 2003 and 2005 in Canada. CIC groups
STCA with a series of measures to reduce asylum flows, demonstrating
that STCA is one piece of an agenda of exclusion from Canadian territory:

CIC, in collaboration with CBSA, continues to look for ways to reduce the
exploitation of Canada’s refugee system by individuals who do not have a
genuine need for protection. The introduction of the Safe Third Country
Agreement with the U.S., judicious use of visitor visa requirements and the
continued use of interdiction measures abroad have contributed to a decline of
almost 20% in asylum claims made within Canada in 2004 in comparison to the
previous year. CIC expects that the number of asylum claimants will continue to
decrease in 2005. (CIC, Parliament 39)

STCA is part of a broader policy agenda of reducing flows via
bilateral agreements, visa restrictions and aggressive interdiction as
demonstrated in literature such as Mountz, Walters and Gibney. The
reduction of flows and the reduction of access are stated goals. It is
troubling that an agreement that officially aims to improve refugee
protection is presented as one of the many strategies for reducing access
to asylum.
In addition to the CIC’s interpretation of STCA as a restrictive
measure, non-governmental parties have interpreted STCA as a policy of
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Failure, places STCA in a broader trend of the reduction of asylum access
in the 4th finding: “The STCA contributes to a rapidly deteriorating refugee
protection regime in North America”:

Although beyond the scope of this report, the implications reach beyond the
borders of the United States, as interdiction policies stretch to Mexico, other parts
of the Americas, and throughout the world. The STCA is only one piece in a
puzzle where refuges are trapped in their countries of origins, unable to flee, and
are denied fundamental rights. (Harvard 4)

Just as the Canadian Government’s CIC presented STCA as one strategy
in a broader agenda of reducing asylum flows, Macklin describes STCA
as:

…not the first or only tactic devised by the Canadian government to impede
asylum seekers from reaching Canadian territory and claiming asylum…Canada
is something of a pioneer in instruments of interdiction. The tools range from
carrier sanctions that punish private airlines and shipping lines from transporting
improperly documented passengers, to imposition of visa requirements on socalled ‘refugee-producing’ countries, to the interception and deflection of ships
suspected of carrying migrants to Canada. (Macklin 5)

The above analyses present an STCA that serves to share the
“burden” of asylum processing with the goal of also reducing the “burden”
of asylum seekers in North America. The Canadian Government justifies
STCA as a policy that will reduce “abuses” to its asylum processing
system by non-genuine refugees; however, there is no evidence that
STCA is accomplishing this goal. STCA does not provide a mechanism for
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seekers being deflected to the U.S are genuine or non-genuine refugees.

Failure to equalize systems
The redirection of asylum flows that were headed towards Canada
back to the U.S. has exacerbated the differences between the U.S. and
Canadian asylum processing systems. Specific populations of asylum
seekers, notably Colombians, are faced with lower acceptance rates in the
U.S. than in Canada. One stated goal of STCA implementation is found in
Article 8.2 of the STCA, when the U.S. Government and the Canadian
Government describe their aim to “resolve differences” (to equalize) their
systems. “These procedures shall include mechanisms for resolving
differences respecting the interpretation and implementation of the terms
of this Agreement. Issues which cannot be resolved through these
mechanisms shall be settled through diplomatic channels.” STCA
implementation does not inherently encourage equality in the systems.
Through my research, I found that the U.S. and Canadian
governments have not attempted to identify specific differences or to
pursue routes to resolving the differences. However, what would be the
danger of the U.S. and Canadian states pursuing their officially stated aim
of resolving differences? As discussed in Chapter 1, research suggests
that equalization would be a “race to the bottom” and an overall lowering
of asylum processing standards.
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differences between the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems exist,
although it does not identify them. Other official statements have
described the two systems as “same” and “equal”. By describing the U.S.
and Canadian systems as equal, the states deny the reality that asylum
seekers experience unequal treatment in North America, giving their
preferences foundations.

Former Canadian Immigration Minister, Coderre, describes the U.S.
and Canadian systems as equal: "The Safe Third Country Agreement
addresses a fundamental concern about asylum shopping for economic
advantage interfering with legitimate claims for refugee protection from
those in genuine need," said the Minister. "Canada and the United States
have the same commitment to refugee protection and the same
international obligations. We also face a common challenge in managing
access to our respective refugee determination systems” (Coderre 1). In
contrast, a number of experts and NGOs contend that the US and Canada
do not make the same commitment to refugee protection or interpret their
international obligations in the “same” manner. Later in this chapter I will
present statements from these sources.

Similar to Coderre’s description of U.S. and Canadian systems,
U.S. officials have been quoted as denying the existence of differences
between the U.S. and Canada that would significantly impact asylum
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the Department of Homeland Security, Joseph Langlois describes the U.S.
argument an exception for those transiting through the U.S. to make
asylum claims in Canada.

Several NGOs urged us to include a transit exception for persons who entered
one country simply for the purpose of proceeding to the other to seek asylum
there. After considering this suggestion, both the U.S. and Canada agreed that
such an exception should not be included. The main reason is that a transit
exception would require a significantly more complex process for determining
whether an individual was subject to return under the agreement, which would
prolong and complicate the determination process to the extent that it could
eliminate the benefit of requiring these individuals to apply in the country of last
presence. (Langlois 4)

It is illogical to predict the trauma experienced by asylum seekers
due to a lengthier processing system is greater than the trauma
experienced by being forced to make a claim in a country that they have
already traveled to in order to receive protection in a different country.
Forcing an asylum seeker to claim asylum in the U.S. as opposed to
Canada may result in deportation in addition to an experience of trauma.
This excerpt also illustrates the struggle of the U.S. Government to
manage asylum flows. Attempting to determine the paths traveled by
asylum seekers would “complicate” the management of asylum. While a
more complex processing system would be in the interest of the asylum
seeker and enhance refugee protection (a stated aim of the STCA),
Langlois’ statement demonstrates that the U.S. Government does not wish
to pursue a route that would require additional resources. Yet STCA does
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asylum seekers deflected from Canada under STCA.
Despite the U.S. and Canadian governments stated goal to “resolve
differences” between their systems, both governments rejected the
implementation of a reconsideration mechanism which would explore and
correct the differences between the U.S. and Canadian systems. In
addition, the reconsideration mechanism would provide the Canadian
Government with a way to measure how many asylum seekers are
genuine refugees and how many are non-genuine refugees who would
“abuse” the Canadian asylum processing system. Currently, there is no
means for the Canadian Government to assess the impact of STCA on
“abuse” reduction. The U.S. chapter of the Partnership report responds to
UNHCR’s request for a reconsideration mechanism to be implemented as
part of STCA:

The Parties do not believe that an individual request for reconsideration of a
threshold screening determination is necessary, because there are sufficient
safeguards and oversight mechanisms in place to ensure that the Agreement is
appropriately applied to each individual case. Neither the Agreement nor the
Statement of Principles provides a right to request reconsideration of a
determination that an asylum seeker should pursue his claim for protection in
Canada or the U.S. pursuant to the Agreement. (United States, Partnership)

By deeming both countries “safe” systems for processing,
monitoring each individual case is not required or conducted by the U.S.
and Canada. STCA does not call for the “safeguards” that would ensure
fair processing of each case. In the next section I discuss the reduction of
asylum protection that has resulted from STCA’s implementation.
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The differences matter
The U.S. and Canada have defended their systems as safe and
nearly equal. However, reports from non-governmental organizations
demonstrate that these differences, whether ignored or acknowledged,
have serious implications for asylum seekers in North America. The
Colombian asylum seeker population has been cited by many sources as
greatly impacted by STCA (USCRI, Harvard, CCR) Since most Colombian
asylum seekers face the geographic necessity of crossing through the
U.S. to reach Canada, STCA creates a wall that results in their chances of
obtaining asylum in North America being significantly diminished.
The Harvard report presents a case study of Colombian asylum
seekers in order to illustrate the significant differences in the U.S. and
Canadian acceptance rates.

The danger posed by the STCA to refugee claimants is most clearly illuminated
by the plight of Colombian refugees. After the STCA went into effect, the number
of Colombian refugees who entered Canada from the United States declined by
approximately 82%. While the acceptance rate in Canada was 81% in 2003 an
2004 and 79% in 2005, the acceptance rate in the Unite States in Fiscal Year
2004 was 45% for those who affirmatively applied and 28% for those appearing
before an immigration judge. Despite continued existence of serious,
widespread human rights abuses in Colombia, several aspects of the U.S.
asylum system pose major obstacles to Colombian refugees seeking protection
in the United States. Because of the STCA, Colombians who previously would
have legally entered the Canadian asylum system are instead exposed to
unnecessary danger and uncertainty in the United States. (Harvard 3)

One U.S. law that has significantly diminished the chance for
Colombian asylum seekers to gain refugee protection in the U.S. is the
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support” to terrorist organizations, regardless of the voluntary or
involuntary nature of the exchange. The conflict in Colombia has created
an environment where innocent bystanders are coerced to provide some
form of support to the paramilitaries. According to the U.S. Committee for
Refugees and Immigrations (USCRI), the REAL ID act has significantly
reduced the possibility of asylum seekers obtaining protection in the U.S.

The lack of an exception for those whose support was involuntary virtually halted
the acceptance of Colombian refugees. The Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stopped referring Colombian refugees to
the United States for resettlement because it estimated that the material support
provision would block 70 percent of applicants, and other potential resettlement
countries might not accept those the United States branded as terrorists. In one
case, guerillas from the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia raped a
woman, killed her husband, and stole their farm animals. Because the guerillas
took her animals, UNHCR believed the United States might deem her to have
given material support to the guerillas. (USCRI 2)

The UNHCR no longer refers Colombians to the U.S. for resettlement, but
those Colombians who travel to the U.S. or through the U.S. to reach
Canada are processed in the U.S. system.
A Washington Post article raises the concern over excluding
asylum on the basis of providing “material support” to terrorist groups:
“Advocates for refugees add that people who were forced to aid terrorist
fighters at gunpoint could be labeled as supporters and turned away…”
The article discusses the individual case of a Colombian nurse who was
not successful in obtaining asylum in the U.S.
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was abducted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) outside
of Bogotá and forced to treat one of their soldiers. She fled Colombia with her
daughter in 2000 after her life was threatened in a note to her family. Her asylum
request was rejected last year. ‘I had no option,’ she said. ‘What will happen if I
go back? I will be killed. They look for people. They know when they arrive at the
airport. They have names.’ (Post 1)

In addition to facing the reality of lower success rates in the U.S.,
refugees may prefer Canada for a variety of reasons. Colombian asylum
seekers may view the U.S. role in Colombia as a root cause of their
displacement. I interviewed Caitlin Brazill, a lawyer for Catholic Legal
Services- Asylum Division, specializes in Colombian asylum casework.
Brazill describes the “material support” bar as “one of the major obstacles,
especially for those who were forced to pay ransom for their spouses or
children.” In some cases, the difficulty faced during the asylum application
process in the U.S. can result in Colombians feeling “frustrated”. Brazill
generalized, “at least 15 of my clients have said, ‘I should have gone to
Canada. I should have gone to Spain’.”
Colombia is not on the U.S. list of countries with visa restrictions;
however, Brazill describes the process for obtaining a visa as “more
restrictive”, noting that there is a growing market for fake visas, “they sell
for three to five thousand U.S. dollars”.
The Colombian population may not seek asylum in the U.S. since
the U.S. is playing a role in their displacement. The U.S. has been
present in Colombia for over a century, most recently through the
execution of Plan Colombia, a U.S. aid initiative to eradicate the growth of
coca in the country. Plan Colombia has been criticized as fueling the
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transnational analysis of U.S. involvement in Colombia is necessary and
would illustrate the geopolitical structurings of asylum. The U.S. may
discriminate against asylum seekers from countries on the basis of
political or geopolitical engagements (or disengagements).
Colombian asylum seekers highlight differences between the U.S.
and Canadian systems. The outcomes of asylum adjudications in the two
countries are dramatically different. In addition to presenting the case
study of Colombians, the Harvard report provides a summary of
differences in the two systems that influence asylum success rates.
One explanation for why the Canadian asylum system is more
appealing to asylum seekers than the U.S. system is that:

Prior to the STCA, individuals voluntarily entered Canada’s well-regulated
refugee determination system because the Canadian system offered attractive
incentives for legalizing status, such as protection from refoulement, employment
authorization, and access to public education and health care, during pending
asylum determinations. …Refugee claimants stranded in the United States
frequently are statutorily barred from applying from asylum, and even those who
are eligible for asylum have strong incentives not to regularize their status. For
example, asylum applicants in the United States cannot receive employment
authorization, benefits, or government-sponsored legal representation while
awaiting determination of their claim. Further, individuals are wary of entering
what is too often dysfunctional and arbitrary U.S. asylum system. (Harvard 21)

The differences between the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems
matter, in addition to the political histories and contemporary geopolitics.
These result in material impacts and potentially different outcomes on
claims for asylum seekers. Until these differences are resolved in a way
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the U.S. and Canada, asylum seekers’ preferences are justified.

A call for further investigation
Until the protection gaps are closed and the multiple issues
surrounding the implementation of STCA are resolved, it is in the best
interest of asylum seekers to revoke the policy. Before a continuation of
STCA, there is a need for further study and evaluation of STCA by the
U.S. and Canadian governments, international organizations such as the
UNHCR and the International Committee for the Red Cross as well as
parties outside of the agreement such as think tanks, NGOs and
academics. The Partnership report’s evaluation of the implementation of
STCA merely examines whether the policy was implemented as agreed by
the U.S. and Canada. The report does not assess the broad impacts of
the policy on asylum flows and refugee protection. In addition, none of the
parties reexamine the basis of the agreement, which would involve an
assessment of whether the U.S. and Canada are safe countries and
exactly “how safe” they are.
The UNHCR endorses STCA:

Since the Agreement came into force, asylum seekers have been provided with
access to a full and fair refugee status determination process in one country or
the other. Implementation has been in full compliance with international refugee
protection principles and in accordance with international human rights
instruments. By establishing clear and consistent criteria for the allocation of
responsibility for adjudicating asylum applications, an effective mechanism to
share responsibility for providing protection to refugees in North America has
been established. At the land borders, exceptions are being effectively
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in place an orderly process, the Agreement has served to reduce the potential for
misuse and strengthened public confidence in the integrity of both countries’
refugee determination systems. (UNHCR, Partnership)

The UNHCR evaluated the adherence of the U.S. and Canadian
governments to the measures set out in the policy of STCA. The UNHCR
argues that both states implemented the Agreement in a way that
complies with international refugee obligations, but does not evaluate the
broader issues surrounding the implementation of STCA and the
arguments for its revocation.
As of spring 2007, the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR)
provides the most comprehensive response to the Partnership report and
asks the questions that were not discussed by the U.S. and Canadian
governments or the UNHCR. Opposition to STCA from CCR occurred
before the signing of the Agreement, mobilizing protest from NGOs across
Canada.
The first formal challenge of STCA in Canada was in December
2005, when CCR joined Amnesty International, the Canadian Council of
Churches and a Colombian asylum seeker in the U.S. filed a lawsuit
against the Canadian Government, claiming that Canada violates its
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its international refugee and
humanitarian obligations as a party to the Agreement. The parties call for
a revocation of STCA on the grounds that the U.S. is not a “safe” country
for asylum processing and that passing off responsibility of processing
asylum seekers to the U.S. violates Canadian domestic and international
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opposition in Canada against STCA.
Aside from the ongoing litigation of the lawsuit, CCR has produced
a number of reports and press releases on STCA, some in direct response
to Canadian, U.S. and UNHCR statements or reports.
The CCR responds to the Partnership report through the CCR
“Safe Third Brief to Standing Committee”, by calling for a reevaluation of
the U.S. being considered a “safe” country for asylum processing.

In November 2006, the CCR made a submission to Cabinet presenting evidence
that, since the US was designated as a safe third country, there have been a
series of developments that mean that the US fails to meet the safe third country
test, according to the definition and the factors established in the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act. …This report failed to address the fundamental question
of the impact of the Agreement on refugees. It reviewed how the Agreement was
being implemented and not what happened to refugees who were turned back at
the border or who learned that the Canadian border was closed to them. The
report also failed to analyze developments in the US policies and practices and
whether these mean that the US can no longer be properly considered a safe
third country. (CCR, Brief)

CCR discusses important areas for investigation that the UNHCR,
U.S. and Canadian states did not pursue for their year review of STCA
such as changes in asylum processing, the individual handling of cases
and the counting of persons excluded by STCA. An assessment was
made of the implementation of STCA but not of the actual impact of the
Agreement on persons seeking asylum in North America.
In addition to CCR’s appearance before the Standing Committee,
CCR issued a report, Less Safe Than Ever in November 2006, which
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on the U.S. no longer being a “safe” country for asylum seekers:

The federal Cabinet has the obligation under Canadian law to review the status
of the U.S. as a safe third country. In light of the substantial changes in policy
and practice in the U.S. since the last review, the U.S. can no longer be
considered a safe third country, according to the definition and factors
established in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (CCR, Less 37)

Earlier on in the report, the CCR offers a description of detailed
concerns of designating the U.S. a safe third country:

…detention practices incompatible with international standards; eligibility bars to
asylum (notably excluding most claimants who have been in the U.S. for more
than a year); restrictive interpretations of the refugee definition (notably with
respect to gender-based claims); patterns of discrimination, particularly against
Muslims and Arabs; and eroding standards of procedural protections, such as
restrictions on access to meaningful review by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
(CCR, Less 8)

The CCR, at the minimum, is demanding that the Canadian
Government review its designation of the U.S. as being a “safe” country
for asylum seekers. CCR hopes to achieve a revocation of STCA
however it is not likely that this will occur due to the close trade
relationship between the U.S. and Canada.

Human smuggling as a response to STCA
Among the many aspects of STCA that solicit further investigation,
the influence of STCA on human smuggling and trafficking is of an urgent
nature. The Canada chapter of the Partnership report strikes down claims
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implementation of STCA. Below the Canadian government summarizes
the concerns it has received regarding a potential increase in human
smuggling due to STCA implementation:

During the development phase and since implementation of the Agreement,
considerable concern has been expressed by stakeholders and parliamentarians
about the possible increase in irregular crossings resulting from the Agreement
coming into force. Advocates believe that by limiting access at the land border
POEs, claimants who fail to meet an exception may be forced to make
dangerous crossings in order to gain access to the Canadian refugee
determination system. (Canada, Partnership)

The Canadian Government claims that there has been a decrease in
human smuggling:

However, since implementation, Canadian and U.S. law enforcement agencies
report that apprehensions of irregular migrants known to have attempted to cross
the international border declined (in both directions) in 2005 from the previous
year. In 2005, there have been no appreciable shifts from the previous year
noted in irregular migration to reflect diversion from the land border to either entry
between ports or at air and marine POEs. (Canada, Partnership)

The language used by the Canadian Government in this summary
is passive, denying the agency of the state to execute interventions in
smuggling networks. The Canadian and U.S. governments have the
power to intervene or to ignore informal border movements. The
Canadian Government notes found that all POEs processed fewer claims
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for an analysis of smuggling since they do not demonstrate an attempt to
measure informal movements or persons not gaining access to U.S. and
Canadian sovereign territory:

The overall number of refugee claims decreased considerably from 2004 to
2005 (approximately 23 percent), and the Agreement may have contributed to a
particular decline in the number of land border claims (approximately 55 percent)
from 2004 to 2005. However, this decrease has not been reflected in any
appreciable shift of the same nationalities that traditionally entered claims at land
borders to air or marine POEs or inland offices. Inland office claims have also
decreased in 2005, but as a relative proportion of overall claims, the percentage
of claims made inland has risen due to a larger decline in POE claims (Canada,
Partnership)

The fifty-five percent decrease in claims made at the land border
raises a number of questions that are not answered by the U.S.
Government, Canadian Government, or the UNHCR in the Partnership
report. Asylum claims for the Canadian system decreased by half within
the first year of the implementation of STCA because the asylum seekers
were either turned back to the U.S. or deterred from traveling to the
U.S./Canadian border. One cannot help but wonder how many asylum
seekers remained undocumented in the U.S. or how many asylum
seekers crossed from the U.S. into Canada by employing irregular
migration tactics. In the above excerpt, the Canadian Government claims
that there has not been a “shift” in nationalities making claims in Canada
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nationalities of asylum seekers.

Table 1: Refugee Claim Intake in Canada by Year and Location

Calendar Total

Canada-U.S. Land

Airport Inland

Year

Intake

Border

2002

33,461

10,856

4,693 17,912

2003

31,893

10,940

4,179 16,774

2004

25,521

8,896

3,456 13,169

2005

19,735

4,033

3,337 12,365

The statistics and analysis from the Canadian chapter of the
Partnership report do not measure informal border crossings or those
potential refugees that did not or could not reach the land border to make
a claim. Additionally, the statistics do not speak to the persons in the U.S.
and Canada who choose to remain underground due to STCA. The
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, who I interviewed,
explained that human smuggling is “not a new phenomenon and not
significantly worsened by STCA.” However, increased regulation of
irregular migration under STCA provides an incentive for the expansion of
the smuggling industry.

- 55 The U.S. and Canadian governments lack data or have not
released data to evaluate the impact of human smuggling. Despite a lack
of government issued evidence, there have been a number of informal
border movements that have gained media attention. Although news
reports, both non-government and government, do not replace data
analysis, they illustrate that illicit border flows are occurring in the time
period following implementation of STCA and highlight specific
populations experiencing difficulty in navigating North American asylum
systems.

A press release from the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) on February 14, 2006, described the apprehension of a
smuggling network. Through a joint investigation by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and Canadian authorities 16 people were charged
with “conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens into the United States, and also
with harboring and transporting illegal aliens within the United States.”
The indictment demonstrates the cooperation between the U.S. and
Canada to combat irregular migration. The press release quoted U.S.
Attorney Murphy saying that “The charges are based upon the interdiction
of at least 74 illegal aliens smuggled into the United States by the
conspiracy, and the more than 2,000 incriminating telephone
conversations intercepted by the RCMP during the latter part of 2005.”
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year that STCA was implemented. While this group of smugglers may not
have increased their activity due to STCA, their assistance of moving at
least 74 persons across the border is quite significant. How many of the
“illegal aliens” are persons in need of asylum? How many potential
refugees employed the services of this smuggling network to make their
asylum claims?

There was another major crackdown at the U.S./Canadian border in
2005, during STCA’s first year; the discovery of a tunnel that connected
the state of Washington and British Columbia. This tunnel is the first
discovered on the U.S./Canadian border. An article from the USINFO
archive reports the first tunnel discovered on the U.S./Canadian border in
July 2005. U.S. Attorney John McKay states that, “The presence of a
tunnel on our northern border threatens the security of both countries,
whether it is used to smuggle drugs, contraband or even terrorists.
Shutting it down, just as it is completed, is a huge blow to these criminals”
(USINFO 1).

McKay’s quote implies that he views all tunnel activity to be illegal
and threatening to national security. There is no mention of the tunnel
being used by asylum seekers to reach sovereign territory to gain refugee
protection.
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above, “Tunnel Discovered Between Canada and U.S.; Joint Investigation
Leads to Arrest of Drug Smugglers,” illustrates the significance of the
tunnel to the state:

Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Seattle Field
Division, Rodney Benson states ‘this tunnel seizure, the first of its kind on the
United States and Canada border, is one of only 34 cross-border tunnels ever
discovered in the United States. This unregulated and uncontrolled point of entry
could have constituted a real threat to the United States, not only in terms of drug
trafficking, but to the national security of our nation. (USINFO 2)

These government articles illustrate the intentional or unintentional
disconnect made by government employees between border enforcement
policies and illicit cross-border flows. Crackdowns offer a glimpse into the
market forces at work over the U.S./Canadian border. People are buying
and selling in order to increase their mobility and the market appears to be
healthy during the early years of STCA.
However, governments intentionally may ignore these links. The
two news releases cited above made by the U.S. Government describe
two high-profile crackdowns at the border. These events may serve to
offer a false appearance of border security through the apprehension of
the migrant “others’” bodies. While the U.S. and Canadian states chose to
make the bodies involved in these networks visible, how many migrant
bodies are being pushed out of sight in order to give the impression of
effective border enforcement?
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bureaucrats continue to claim that “there is no evidence” to back the claim
of increased smuggling in response to policies such as STCA. A lack of
statistics makes it difficult to STCA’s role in border movements and to
contest the hollow claims made by government servants.

Eroding asylum
As long as STCA continues to operate as part of a security agenda
of migration control which includes exclusionary tactics such as
interdiction, off-shore processing, and visa restrictions, support for asylum
in the U.S. and Canada both within the government and outside will
continue to erode. The U.S. Government agreed to STCA in order to
entice the Canadian Government to sign onto SBA. Although garnering
support for the institution of asylum is a stated goal of STCA, the policy
inherently and structurally reduces the legitimacy of asylum processing.
The U.S. and Canadian governments state that they aim to enhance the
legitimacy of their respective asylum processing systems, “desiring
to…strengthen the integrity of that institution (asylum) and the public
support on which it depends” (STCA Final Text). In turn, STCA reduces
the level of refugee protection in North America by restricting the access
of asylum seekers to the Canadian system for adjudication, a system that
has historically higher acceptance rates for specific populations such as
Colombians.
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between the U.S. and Canadian asylum systems such as differential
treatment of Colombians, benefits granted to asylum claimants during their
processing period, security policies such as the REAL ID Act, and
detention practices. Prior to STCA some asylum seekers traveled to the
country that best met their protection needs and where they enjoyed
higher acceptance rates. Asylum seekers are now at the mercy of the
border patrol agent who distributes flows through the “threshold screening
interview”. The asylum seekers are the bodies of the U.S./Canadian
border caught in the landslide of an eroding North American protection
regime.
In this chapter I have analyzed the official aims of STCA and the
realities of implementation that do not serve these aims. In the following
chapter, I will present a reading of the policy from those directly involved
with STCA through analyzing a series of interviews I conducted in 2006.
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This chapter presents and analyzes data gathered in 2006. I
conducted 20 interviews with government employees, academics and
NGO employees regarding STCA. The semi-structured interviews took
place in Washington, DC, Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa. While the
majority of the interviews were conducted in person, some occurred by
phone. Generally speaking, the duration of the interviews was one hour. I
recorded interview notes by hand instead of voice recording the interviews
because I was not allowed to bring recording devices into some of the
interview venues.
Some of the participants are named because these persons
specifically requested that they be identified. Those who made such
requests were NGO employees, researchers and asylum lawyers. I
interviewed Janet Dench who serves as the Executive Director of the
Canadian Council of Refugees (CCR) and Martin Jones who is a
Research Associate for the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University
in Ontario.
The government servants requested to speak off the record and for
purposes of protecting their identities; I do not provide titles of their
positions or home departments within their governments. The government
interviewees are referred to with gender-neutral pseudonyms. Within the
U.S. federal government, I conducted interviews at the Department of
State and the Department of Homeland Security. Within the Canadian
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Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
I posed a series of questions regarding STCA. My initial questions
solicited information that would place STCA in the context of
U.S./Canadian relations and increasing border security efforts such as the
Smart Border Declaration and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of
North America. My secondary questions probed the function of STCA as
an implemented policy. Please refer to Appendix 2 for a list of interview
questions. My goal was to learn the motivation and impetus for the
development and signing of STCA as one step to understand the policy’s
impact on asylum seekers. I attempted to identify the priorities of the
parties involved in relation to border regulation.
In this section, I will analyze the findings from the interviews
conducted, paying particular attention to the points in which the
discussions diverged and connected. I aim to extract the themes,
patterns, and debates contained within the discussions of Safe Third. In
addition, I seek to connect these findings to the broader debates in
international refugee protection and security beyond the scopes of these
interviews.

The signing of STCA

- 62 The series of questions that initiated dialogue during the interviews
aimed to uncover the impetus for STCA. Why was it signed when it was?
What were the motivations of both nation-states?
Participants’ responses demonstrated that the U.S. and Canada
had different motivations for signing STCA and benefited from the
Agreement in different ways. The Canadian Government wanted to sign
STCA in order to reduce the flow of asylum seekers to Canada from the
U.S. Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, described the
Canadian asylum system as being “overburdened” prior to the signing of
STCA and that public support was declining as a result of providing
benefits to asylum seekers, particularly in the 1990s. Morgan estimated
that one third of all asylum seekers who arrived in Canada came from the
U.S. and that very few went to the U.S. from Canada. STCA requires the
U.S. to process the asylum seekers who would have previously traveled to
Canada to claim asylum. Simply stated, the Canadian Government’s goal
was to reduce the asylum seeker flow from the U.S. by having the U.S.
increase processing. Morgan described this joint processing as “sharing
the burden” in managing asylum flows.
I received a similar but expanded response from Canadian
Government Representative, Jamie, who explained that STCA was signed
for security purposes in addition to being a response to the “backlog” in
the Canadian system. The “backlog” refers to a period in Canadian
asylum processing during the 1990s when the Immigration and Refugee
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claims. The claims made by these two servants warrant an investigation
into the documented changes in public opinion in Canada regarding
refugee protection during the “backlog” period. Additionally, research
executed on the shifting numbers of refugees making claims in the
Canadian system over the past two decades would be relevant.
The Canadian Government’s goal, as described by representatives
Morgan and Jamie, to reduce asylum flows was achieved within the first
year of STCA’s implementation. According to the Canadian Government’s
chapter in the Partnership report, the overall number of refugee claims
dropped 23 percent between years 2004 and 2005. The Canadian
Government explains that “the Agreement may have contributed to a
particular decline in the number of land border claims (approximately
55 percent) from 2004 to 2005,” (Partnership Canada Chapter).
According to Table 1 in the Canada chapter, in 2004, there were 8,896
claims for refugee status in Canada made at the U.S./Canadian land
border and this number decreased to 4,033 in 2005 (Partnership Canada
Chapter). A decrease in asylum flow intake at the land border was
achieved with the implementation of STCA, serving Canada’s agenda of
“burden-sharing”.
In contrast, I found that the U.S. motivation for signing STCA was
unclear since the U.S. does not directly “benefit” from the agreement in
relation to asylum seeker flows. U.S. Government Representative, Casey,
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“Why did the US sign it? What does the US get? Does it work?” Similarly,
a Congressional Research Service employee, Bailey, asked me to explore
“who benefits from STCA” because it is not clear how the U.S.
Government benefits. I estimate that these questions were raised by
persons inside and outside the government because STCA actually
increases the amount of processing by the U.S. Government; STCA
diverts potential Canadian refugee flows to the U.S. for handling. Another
possible explanation for these questions is that U.S. motivations regarding
STCA were not articulated publicly. The act of probing U.S. intentions
surrounding STCA demonstrates that U.S. motivations were not clearly
defined to all within the U.S. Government.

Relationship between STCA and SBA
The answers to these questions materialize when STCA is placed
in the context of SBA. STCA is not a policy that stands in isolation for the
U.S. Government. The indirect benefits to the U.S. Government emerged
from my discussions with bureaucrats on both sides of the border. STCA
is a bilateral agreement that the Canadian Government had wanted for at
least a decade. Canadian Government Representative, Morgan,
described STCA as the piece that Canada had wanted for “20 years” and
explained that the U.S. used it as a “carrot” to bring Canada on board with
SBA. According to Morgan, the U.S. performed “foot dragging” because it
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U.S. Government Representative, Alex, explained that “STCA was
something Canada wanted for years” and that it was a way to “get Canada
on board for the 30 point action plan”. While dialogue surrounding the
border had continued on some level between the U.S. and Canada for
many years, the event of 9/11 provided the catalyst to negotiate a
comprehensive border policy between the U.S. and Canada. In the
context of heightening security, STCA became part of the broad SBA, as
one of the 32 points. The U.S. signed onto STCA in order to gain
Canada’s cooperation with SBA. As Canadian Government
Representative, Morgan, explained, “STCA and Smart Border were thrown
together out of necessity of the focus on security post 9/11. The basis of
STCA was not security.”
SBA serves a variety of agendas: trade efficiency, security and the
reduction of asylum flows in North America. It makes sense, therefore
that the persons I interviewed provided very different responses to my
questions regarding the purpose of Smart Border. Since, “the basis of
STCA was not security” (Morgan), how can STCA be included as an
action point for the SBA? How does SBA relate to asylum and refugee
protection?
One outcome of SBA desired by both governments is an increase
in cross-border information sharing. Canadian Government
Representative, Jamie, described the most important aspects of SBA as
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Government Representative, Pat, suggested that the “Smart Border is
about trade and efficiency, not terrorism. STCA is not that significant.”
Pat also noted that before 9/11 there was poor information sharing and
said that now there is “constant communication”.
In contradiction to the above claim, STCA does make provisions for
the facilitation of information sharing. Below are excerpts from the final
text of the STCA. Articles 7 and 8 specifically encourage information
sharing.

ARTICLE 7
The Parties may:
a.
Exchange such information as may be necessary for the effective
implementation of this Agreement subject to national laws and
regulations. This information shall not be disclosed by the Party
of the receiving country except in accordance with its national
laws and regulations. The Parties shall seek to ensure that
information is not exchanged or disclosed in such a way as to
place refugee status claimants or their families at risk in their
countries of origin.
b.
Exchange on a regular basis information on the laws, regulations
and practices relating to their respective refugee status
determination system.
ARTICLE 8
1.
The Parties shall develop standard operating procedures to assist with the
implementation of this Agreement. These procedures shall include
provisions for notification, to the country of last presence, in advance of
the return of any refugee status claimant pursuant to this Agreement.
(Final Text of the Safe Third Country Agreement)

In addition to information sharing and trade efficiency two interviewees
raised the goal of minimizing security threats from Canada was raised by
two interviewees. In response to my question regarding the priority of the
Northern border for the United States, Lee Hamilton explained that, “The
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Northern border is “more of a focus” due to the Muslim population in
Canada. The U.S. has a larger Muslim population than Canada. Thus,
why is the Canadian Muslim population considered to be “more of a
focus”? Are Muslim Canadians viewed as security threats?
At briefing at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, the officers discussed
US/Canadian relations from their perspectives of working in the Embassy.
I questioned the Economic Officer about the controversy and impact of the
SBA and STCA. Appropriate to his position, he discussed the need to
maintain a healthy economic relationship with Canada but did not mention
migration. The Economic Officer stated that the goal is to make the
border “safe but open to commerce, not to damage the economic
relationship”. Does this statement imply that a ‘safe’ border is one that is
not open to asylum seekers? Or that the cross-border movements of
humans and goods for economic purposes take precedence over flows of
persons in need of refugee protection?
In response to my questions regarding the motivations and
purposes of STCA and SBA, neither refugee protection nor increasing
access for asylum seekers were presented as priorities; these goals were
not mentioned.

Lack of information
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impact of STCA in its first year of implementation. What is STCA actually
accomplishing or not accomplishing? Is STCA enhancing refugee
protection, as it officially aims to in its final text? I also asked questions
about the impact of STCA on migration flows across the border,
specifically regarding its impact on human smuggling. The responses that
follow demonstrate the need for research on the impact of STCA on
informal border movements such as smuggling and trafficking.
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, acknowledged
that, unfortunately, the impact of the policy was difficult to measure.
Morgan explained that “smuggling is not a new phenomenon” and that
there is no evidence that it is worse now as a result of STCA.
Canadian Government Representative, Jamie, discussed the
networks across the border. It was confirmed that Vive la Casa in Buffalo
coordinates with Canadian border officials; however it was not discussed
in what ways. Vive la Casa is a large NGO that assists asylum flows. It is
beyond the scope of this project to conduct a study of the ways in which
STCA influences the structure of cross-border networks. However, an
investigation of the relationship between government, NGOs and asylum
flows would be relevant to understanding the impact of STCA. This
representative also stated that there is no evidence of an increase in
smuggling and irregular migration but acknowledged that there is
“pressure” for these movements to increase. The above claims that
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made without evidence backing them and contradict the evidence
presented in chapter 2 from secondary sources.
There is research that evaluates the relationship between border
policies and human smuggling (Mountz, Sharma). Sharma offers insight
into the impact of restrictive border policies on informal cross-border flows
by problematizing the criminalization of persons who engage in and
execute smuggling and trafficking plans by presenting these routes as
migration strategies. The migration strategies of smuggling and trafficking
become more salient and necessary as state migration policies become
more restrictive.

…most people using migration as a survival strategy today are unable to move
without the aid of smugglers who move people for profit instead of for reasons of
social justice. It is virtually impossible for migrants today to move without the
assistance of forgers who produce the necessary identity papers for travel.
Furthermore, clandestine migrations usually involve one form of deception or
another at border crossings. Often, but certainly not always, migrants experience
coercion and even abuse during their journeys. (Sharma 91)

In addition to debates within literature regarding human smuggling,
there are historical examples of the smuggling and policy relationship. An
important piece of analyzing the influence of STCA on human smuggling
would be a review of Safe Third’s impact on informal movements in
Europe and, where possible, in North America.
In response to my question regarding an increase in human
smuggling since STCA, Dench of the Canadian Council for Refugees
replied that “we are just seeing the beginning of the human smuggling
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take some time. And we must think about how many people just don’t
have access now.” Since informal movements and access are difficult to
measure, an increase in inland claims would not necessarily indicate an
increase of smuggling.
In addition to monitoring informal movements, there is a lack of
information regarding the processing of a case from start to finish. How
have the experiences of asylum seekers changed since STCA
implementation? Martin Jones, a refugee lawyer and researcher,
emphasized the need to increase monitoring of case processing and
asked, “Do people actually get removed?” What are the details of
detention, adjudication and deportation for asylum seekers processed
under STCA?
Persons within the U.S. Government are raising similar questions
as well as those outside. The United State Government Representative,
Casey, asked a series of questions regarding the impact of STCA: “How
are asylum seekers now processed? Is U.S./Canadian integration
permanent? What are the federal and local responses? What are the
problems with non-identical obligations in both countries?” That
government employees raise these questions a year after the policy’s
implementation demonstrates the inadequacy of monitoring and
communicating the impacts of STCA at multiple scales: the federal state,
the individual asylum seeker, communities lining the border, and so on.
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order to understand whether asylum seekers are having difficulty
accessing asylum through formal channels and are resorting to informal
migration strategies. Do the U.S. and Canadian governments view
measurement of these clandestine movements as priorities? If informal
movements were closely monitored and showed a significant increase
since the implementation of STCA, it would demonstrate that people are
using informal channels to gain refugee protection because the formal
channels are insufficient or perceived to be by asylum seekers. While
states may view smuggling to be a “phenomenon” (as described by
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan), smuggling often
increases in response to the policies implemented by states. As
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, in many cases, smuggling is in direct
response to state policy. It is possible that asylum seekers will employ
smuggling networks as a means to reach the sovereign territories to make
their asylum claims.
Aside from the important questions of how to measure informal
movements across the border, it is also important to develop ways to
measure or estimate the number of asylum seekers who are not
accessing the U.S. or Canadian systems at any level due to STCA. How
is STCA preventing or discouraging access to North American refugee
protection?
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considered a security risk. Canada’s system has been criticized by the
U.S. Government for being too open and lenient in comparison to the U.S.
system. However, it could be argued that failing to monitor undocumented
movements or to formalize the status of those estimated 12 million
migrants in the U.S. who are undocumented is also a security risk.
Dench explained that “the Canadian system does not create security risks
necessarily. The Canadian system is formal.” The formality of the
Canadian system refers to having a significantly smaller population of
persons who are undocumented in Canada in contrast to the U.S. The
regulatory and deterrent functions of STCA may result in asylum seekers
remaining undocumented in the U.S. or employing human smugglers to
cross the U.S./Canadian border. This possibility raises a number of
concerns about the national and human security.

Refugee agency versus state agency: an unnecessary binary
The liberal state faces the paradox of maintaining open borders to
trade and the movement of humans for the purposes of labor, while
regulating the borders in regards to immigration and security. As
sovereign states exercise their right to control their territorial borders,
refugee agency is pitted against the agency of the state. As I discussed in
chapter 1, there is a constant battle for inclusion and exclusion.
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chooses the new nation-state? The asylum seeker or nation state? If
your state fails you, if you’re harmed should you have the right to
choose?” Sam contended that the state has the right to control its borders
and that the state chooses who enters. Without a defined “right to entry”,
states manipulate these geographies of asylum to deny access without
blatantly violating their international obligations to refugee protection.
Regarding my question about the asylum seeker having the right to enter
the state of their choice, Dench noted that, “There isn’t a spelled out ‘right
to choose’ for asylum seekers but there’s no requirement that an asylum
seeker must make a claim in his/her first safe country of presence.”
While manipulating geographies of asylum for the purposes of
reducing flows may serve the U.S. and Canadian states’ short term
agendas, restricting asylum seeker mobility is not in the long term interest
of the state. Putting aside questions of the legality of refugee versus state
agency, Dench emphasized that there are “moral questions of choice” as
well: “For refugees, most choices have already been taken away from
them and they have suffered trauma. So it is a respect issue. You
respect the refugee’s wishes to stay in Canada or the U.S. or to go to a
different country.”
Dench then tied the ‘right to choose’ to the national interest of the
state: “The state is better off having people who want to be there. Forcing
a state on them is senseless. Let them choose and they are more willing
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outcomes desired, the future is not promising. Refugee choice is a long
term policy interest. The policies are too short sited right now.” Providing
refugees with a “right to choose” would help the state improve its policies
by serving as a gauge of efficacy.
Jones explained that allowing refugees to choose their states for
asylum processing provides states with indicators of protection gaps or
systems that are effective in providing refugee protection. Jones
employed the idea of the asylum system being a “market”. When I posed
a question regarding the differences between the U.S. and Canadian
asylum processing systems matter, he replied, “it seems to matter to
asylum seekers themselves. Choice becomes relevant in the way you
look down upon spontaneous asylum seekers. I’m a believer in the
market. There’s a reason that people want to go to Canada. There really
must be more protection in Canada.”
Dench presented the “absurdity” of STCA, by explaining, “The
people getting to Canada were refugees. If they weren’t, why wouldn’t
they just stay in the U.S.?” Geographically, it would not be logical for a
migrant to prolong his or her journey by traveling through the U.S. to
Canada. There are few explanations for extending one’s trip, one being
the need for a higher level of refugee protection or increased access to
refugee protection.
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The state can benefit from studying the choices that refugees make and
the demands they place on the system. In the long term, informed
refugee choice may lead to more stable resettlement situations. However,
refugee agency challenges sovereignty. As I explained in chapter 1, the
regulation of the mobile body reinforces the sovereignty of the state.
The regulation of the Haitian population through the application of
STCA serves as an example of state agency usurping refugee agency.
As presented in chapter 2, the U.S. and Canada formed a side agreement
during the signature of STCA that made Canada responsible for resettling
a number of Haitian refugees. The Haitian displaced population has
historically been a difficult population for the U.S. due to the proximity of
Haitians to U.S. sovereign territory. The U.S. practices interdiction to
deflect the flows of Haitians before reaching U.S. soil in order to deny
them access to asylum. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and
Immigrants (USCRI) discusses the U.S. control of the Haitian population:

The United States returned some 1,800 Haitian and 3,000 Cuban asylum
seekers it interdicted on the high seas while they were trying to reach Florida.
The only way the Haitians could claim asylum was to shout their claim out on the
Coast Guard vessel prior to return, but even this did not always work. The Coast
Guard took those who passed the “shout” test to the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where Department of Homeland Security (DHS) asylum
officers interviewed them on the merits of their claims. DHS, however, did not
permit those they found to be refugees to enter the United States, but continued
to detain them until they could find another country to accept them. (USCRI 2)

Canadian Government Representative, Jamie, discussed the
agreement regarding the resettlement of Haitians as an incentive for the
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representative listed information sharing and Canada’s agreement to
resettle Haitians.
Regarding the “deal” in STCA for the processing of Haitians, Dench
explained that the U.S. Government interdicts boats of Haitian migrants,
houses them at Guantanamo and sends them to Canada to be processed
as asylum seekers. The side deal of STCA demonstrates the U.S.
utilization of policy to usurp the agency of displaced Haitians and to evade
the geographical proximity of Haiti to the U.S. Canada offered to resettle
Haitians in order to make STCA more attractive to the U.S. (Macklin).

What is “safe”?
The foundation of STCA is that both the U.S. and Canadian
systems of asylum processing are considered to be “safe”. This United
States Government Representative, Sam, stressed the concept of “safe”
during our discussion of STCA, “What does STCA call for? The concept
of ‘safe’. The concept that a country does not engage in refoulement.”
There are a range of definitions and levels of “safe” that were
presented in the interviews. Sam acknowledged that the concept of “safe”
for the U.S. and Canada is “debatable”. Sam offered the posed the
question regarding the U.S. asylum system, “Is the failure so egregious
that we don’t have a reasonable system? Our system assures that we will
not commit refoulement…but we make mistakes.” What version of “safe”
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whole being “safe” seems irrelevant when each case must be handled
“safely”.
What is a “safe” system. Jones provided an interesting analysis of
the “safe” concept and the “finger pointing” that goes on between the U.S.
and Canada. He agreed that not engaging in refoulement is the minimum
consideration of being a “safe” country but that a country can engage in
refoulement indirectly. “If a state restricts many refugee convention rights
which, in effect, pushes them to leave, then isn’t that refoulement?” As
Western states fortify entire regions from asylum flows, persons in need of
protection have fewer opportunities to reach sovereign territory to make
their asylum claims. I argue that the trends discussed in chapter 1 of
pushing asylum seekers away from sovereign territory through the
externalizing and transnationalizing of borders is a form of refoulement
(Mountz).
Since the U.S. and Canada handle asylum cases in different ways,
there is a demand from critics of STCA and from the UNHCR is that the
U.S. and Canadian states implement an appeals mechanism. This
provision would allow asylum seekers to argue their case for applying in
one country over the other. The Canadian system is guided by the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of 2002 and the U.S.
system is guided by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Pistone presents the policies governing the
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preceded the IIRIRA.

The 1995 regulations also eliminated the automatic grant of a work permit when
an application for asylum is filed. Instead, a procedure was established whereby
most work permits are not granted until after a person receives asylum or the
application has been on file with the INS for 180 days. Consequently, the
prospect of receiving work authorization, long perceived as a magnet for frivolous
asylum claims, was eliminated. (Pistone 4)

U.S. Government representative, Sam, explained that a
reconsideration or appeals mechanism for STCA is not necessary since
both countries are deemed “safe”. If an asylum seeker is not processed in
the “safe” system of Canada, the asylum seeker will be processed in the
“safe” system of the U.S. However, the condition of “safe” does not
require that the systems process claims in the same manner. Through
discussions with interviewees, I learned that the differences in the systems
have real implications for refugee protection. Jones, for example,
discussed how the U.S. and Canada interpret STCA and their international
obligations differently, noting that two similar systems produce different
results. The reduction of access to asylum for Colombian asylum seekers
was discussed in chapter 2.
Many interviewees noted some differences as significant during our
discussions. A question emerges: how do these differences or a lack of
equality among the two systems relate, if at all, to the “safety” of the
systems? The employee of the Congressional Research Service, Bailey,
questioned the permanence of the policy and believed there was
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the difference between U.S. and Canadian systems, explaining that
“illegals” are given full constitutional rights under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which is “different from us”. The struggle over
harmonization demonstrates the varied levels of protection offered by the
U.S. and Canadian systems as well as presents the dangers of equalizing
the systems to a reduced standard of refugee protection
When discussing how Canada and the U.S. are comparably “safe”
countries, Dench described Canada’s obligations to asylum seekers.
“International obligations apply to each case. Especially with gender
based claims. When someone steps onto Canadian soil, Canada needs
to apply its interpretation of Safe Third and it is Canada’s responsibility.”
One important difference between the Canadian and American asylum
processing systems is that in the U.S. asylum seekers have one year
limits to apply for asylum. In Canada, there are no time limits. Dench
cited a lack of legal aid and social assistance making it difficult for asylum
seekers, especially women, to apply for asylum under the one year bar.
Pistone discusses the difficulty of asylum seekers to meet the one year
bar for asylum in the U.S.

…the conditions and circumstances surrounding the flight of asylum seekers
prevent them from being able to handle the types of matters we would commonly
expect other arriving immigrants to be able to. …From the moment most asylum
seekers begin their flight from persecution, they are focused on mere survival.
They are typically running away from personal danger and are primarily
concerned with saving their lives. When they arrive in the United States, they
often cannot express their fears of persecution immediately or meet the
application filing deadline necessary for asylum protection. Because many
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government officials and are unable or unwilling to tell the truth about their
persecution to anyone they do not know and trust, let alone a uniformed official.
Having been tortured or severely persecuted, many suffer from mental disorders
that impeded their ability to talk about what happened to them. (Pistone 6)

A major debate among interview participants involved the
significance of visa restrictions between the U.S. and Canada in relation to
asylum processing. The U.S. and Canada have different requirements on
persons that need visas to travel to the U.S. or Canada. If a country
wants to reduce flows of persons from another country, a visa restriction
could be imposed. Many advocates for asylum seekers describe visa
restrictions as measures for Western states to reduce the mobility of
persons from specific countries.
Canadian Government Representative, Jamie, listed the
implementation issues of STCA as being the “direct backs” and detention
practices. This person described the visa discrepancies as “not a big
deal”, meaning that the different visa requirements did not significantly
alter the access to asylum in the U.S. and Canada.
In contrast to the response of some government servants, Dench
noted visa differences and usages as a “major issue”. Canada and the
U.S. impose visas in order to stop flows of asylum seekers from a certain
country. “So the people who need protection most do not get access to
claim asylum.” Ironically, more people come from countries without visa
restrictions to claim asylum; states that do not have horrendous human
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increase of asylum seekers from Mexico making claims in North America.
Dench continued: “It’s not that they don’t need protection. It’s just
that if you look at the people accessing the system, one may say that they
are not in dire need of asylum or that people are abusing the system,
undermining the system. But the states are responsible for who is in the
system. And then they can use it as an argument to further reduce or
deny access to the asylum system. This repackaging creates barriers for
the people who need asylum most.”
The visa issue does not actually fit within the debate of “safe”; it is
the total denial of safe access in the name of security. When states deny
access to certain countries through visa restrictions, potential asylum
seekers from those countries do not have the opportunity to evaluate the
“safe” nature of the destination states’ asylum system.
In chapter 2, I presented a policy related documents that describe
the U.S. and Canada as having the “same” or “similar” systems for asylum
processing. Contrasting the official policy claims, government servants
acknowledged during these interviews that there are a number of
differences between the two systems. One of the stated goals of STCA is
for the U.S. and Canada to resolve differences between their systems and
to harmonize their approaches to asylum regulation. I agree with the
CCR’s request for a review of the “safe” nature of the U.S. system and for
an evaluation of differences between the systems. The differences are
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and transparent evaluation.

Thanking the EU for STCA
If safe third country agreements are not required by international
refugee law then where did the U.S./Canadian STCA come from? In
response to my question regarding the forecast for the North American
refugee protection regime, Dench responded by saying that she believes
“we are heading towards Europe”. My interview findings reinforce the
literature that describes North American control policies as resulting from
an Europeanization process. The EU implemented STCA in 1989.
Through discussion of the emergence of Safe Third Country as a policy
concept, interviewees explained that the U.S. and Canada followed the
EU STCA model that was implemented in the 1980s. States look to one
another for best practices in border enforcement (Mountz). U.S.
Government Representative, Sam, presented STCA as an EU concept.
Along with the circulation of exemplary practices, there is a circulation of
pressure to create the tightest border. This relates to the geography of the
states’ territorial limits. When the EU attempted to reduce asylum flows by
fortifying its external borders, Canada felt pressured to do the same
through bilateral cooperation with the U.S. The pressure stems from the
fear that asylum flows will be deflected from one region to another.
Perhaps Canada believed that a reduction of asylum access in Europe
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processing for the Canadian state.
Canadian Government representative, Morgan, explained that
Canada is following the EU Safe Third model and learning from the EU’s
difficulties with “asylum shopping” and the overburdening of benefit
systems. When placing this excerpt in the context of Europeanization of
North American control strategies, Canada “learned” how to decrease
access to asylum from the EU.

The future of STCA
I questioned interviewees about their expectations of the future of
STCA. Is STCA permanent? Will STCA be expanded to include non-land
POEs such as sea port, air port in addition to the land border? I found that
the Canadian Government representatives expected STCA to expand to
all POEs and that the U.S. Government representatives insisted that
expansion would not occur. The varied responses illustrate the struggle of
states to balance their desires for total control of all POEs and the
geographical realities prevent the attainment of total control.
United States Representative, Sam, responded to my question
regarding the potential expansion of STCA to non-land POEs by
explaining that it was unlikely because only the land POE is “indisputably
under the sovereign states control”. U.S. representative, Pat, provided a
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So, it is not going to happen and is not being considered.”
The U.S. Government representatives may share the Canadian
desire to expand STCA to all non-land POEs, but view it as a difficult task
to define the limits of state sovereignty in an airport or in the ocean. For
example, where does US sovereign territory begin in the Miami airport- in
the tunnel between the plane and the airport building? On the runway?
As demonstrated in the interviews, government employees
understand that they are required to respond to asylum seekers who
reach the land borders. When discussing the ability of states to control
their land POEs, Jones explained that “when a migrant shows up at the
border, Canada has already opened the door. They are already there.
You can’t practice interdiction then. So, do we push them back out or let
them stay?” Both Dench and the United States Government
representatives offer insights into why governments are increasing
processing of potential flows away from the land border and sovereign
territories. These measures are intended to reduce asylum seeker intake
while appearing to uphold obligations to refugee protection.

Making sense of STCA
The official language of STCA says it aims to enhance refugee
protection and border security. I have come to understand STCA to
function as a policy of exclusion for refugees who wish to claim asylum in
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priorities for U.S. and Canadian policy makers and officials regarding
STCA. The interviews I conducted offered a variety of motivations and
goals relating to STCA. Some contradicted others. The U.S. and
Canadian representatives presented very different interests in entering
STCA.
In regards to the Canadian government’s motivations, my findings
demonstrate that one aim of the Canadian Government in signing STCA
was to achieve a reduction in asylum flows, confirming that the aim of
STCA was to exclude potential refugees. Canadian representative,
Morgan, suggests that it was to reduce the flow of asylum seekers into
Canada by having the U.S. “share the burden” of processing. Although
the U.S. and Canada are both signatories to the 1951 Convention, none of
the government employees stated that refugee protection is the top priority
of the policy, or even is a priority. Immigration and refugee protection
were not presented as being relevant to the SBA. To have multiple
discussions with policy makers about the motivations for the signing of
STCA without any mention of refugee protection is disturbing; illustrating a
cavernous gap between paper and practice. In practice, STCA reduces
the access to refugee protection in North America, operating as an
exclusionary measure.
As presented by the official policy statements and by the
interviewees, STCA does not stand on its own; it is a piece in a larger
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accomplish what it claims to in terms of refugee protection, it must
accomplish something else that is relevant to the U.S. and Canadian
governments. STCA is presented as a piece of the Smart Border Action
Plan, a comprehensive policy that would make the border “smarter” and
“safer”. If border regulation is not about the protection of migrants crossing
the border, what does border regulation accomplish? How does STCA fit
into the “importance” of making the border more secure? After 20 years of
STCA not fitting naturally into border policy, how is it fitting now?
United States Representative, Pat, described STCA as an incentive
to bring Canada on board to Smart Border. Yet, the focus of STCA is not
on refugee protection. While STCA is one point of our broader border
plan and does not directly serve U.S. interests, it is impacting the lives of
individuals in need of refugee protection in North America. According to
Pat, STCA may not be “that significant”. However, the implementation of
STCA has had significant and serious consequences for refugees who
experience varying levels of exclusion regardless of where the policy falls
on the list of priorities.
Since STCA does not accomplish its officially stated goals, what
does the policy accomplish for the states? Or perhaps a better question
is, what vision or broader policy for the state is furthered by STCA?
Agendas of control are executed by the U.S. and Canadian states with the
intention of reducing asylum flows. The following interview excerpt
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for enhanced security. At the U.S. Embassy briefing in Ottawa the officers
discussed U.S./Canada relations from their perspectives of working in the
Embassy. The Political Officer discussed cooperation between the U.S.
and Canada by describing the two countries as “partners in defense of
North America”. In response to the language used by the Political Officer
at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, I must ask: What do these and other
government employees perceive what North America is being defended
from?
Some of the interviewees discussed the EU asylum system and
policies as models for North American asylum processing. The mention of
the EU Safe Third policy by Canadian Government Representative,
Morgan, is important because it demonstrates that countries are looking to
each other for common practices in the management of migration
(Mountz). It is important to place the U.S. and Canadian policies on the
global stage of refugee protection and migration management. Is the
ultimate goal of countries such as Australia, Canada, the U.S. and EU
countries to prevent or at least to manage the access to asylum seekers?
While these states may not pursue that goal directly, the implementation
of policies such as safe third country agreements reduces access to
asylum.
The danger of looking to other countries for effective asylum
system models and policies is that these systems are constantly changing.
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victim to changing political tides (Mountz). For example, border regulation
responds to geographical tactics of human smugglers just as human
smuggling networks are designed in response to changes in border
regulation strategies.
Given the dynamic nature of systems, it is imperative that those
working within and outside them constantly evaluate their effectiveness.
Dench dispelled the argument that the Canadian system is “safer” than the
U.S. system in an absolute way by emphasizing the “need to improve and
share concern over what each other is doing. Canada may not always be
‘safe’; the system has its flaws. Same with the U.S. system”. It is
important for us to hold those in the system accountable and to monitor
the shifts in the system. Let us not wait for the day the border has
finalized itself; it will never arrive.
The time has come for those inside and outside of STCA to
respond to the unanswered questions of STCA. CRS employee, Bailey,
asked the question that many of the interviewees asked, “who benefits?” I
was shocked to hear a United States Government Representative, Casey,
and others pose these same questions. In light of the serious human
impact of migration policy shifts or new policies, it is ethical to have these
questions answered before individuals are affected by the policy. Who is
working to provide answers to these questions? In what ways are the
experiences of asylum seekers impacted by the policy? I thought I would
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field work interviews. Instead, the interview participants asked me to
investigate questions surrounding STCA’s impact. Researchers and
government servants can collaborate on investigating the realities of
STCA since asylum seekers themselves are negotiating them on a daily
basis.

“Safe”: a futile title
Lists of ‘safe’ countries can shift intentionally or unintentionally.
States may intentionally reduce measures that provide a high quality of
asylum access or implement measures that deny access altogether in
order to reduce the overall flow of asylum seekers.
The act of deeming a country as ultimately ‘safe’ is irrelevant since
each country must handle each individual case in a way that honors
international obligations to refugee protection. In order for a system to be
‘safe’, the processing of each case must fulfill this title of “fair”. I agree
with United States Representative, Sam, that the U.S. is a relatively “safe”
system for asylum processing compared to other systems but asylum
processing must not be evaluated in relative terms; not all asylum seekers
get equal treatment. For example, the Colombian population has a
significantly lower acceptance rate in the U.S. than in Canada. The issue
at hand is the treatment and protection of each individual asylum seeker.
An asylum system must provide for the proper handling of each case. The
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loss of a human life. Rather than designating countries “safe” for asylum
processing, energy should be devoted by the international community to
evaluate how levels of refugee protection vary depending on the asylum
seekers’ geographical location at the time the claim is made. While it is
outside of the scope of this project to investigate the specific adjudication
processes on multiple scales in the U.S. and Canada, a comparative
analysis would be relevant to evaluating levels of refugee protection
offered in North America.
While the title “safe” is not adequate to describe an asylum system,
the implementation of the STCA has made the debate about the concept
of “safe” relevant to the reality of seeking asylum in North America. This
concept is the justification for the STCA policy and translates into the
actual experience of the asylum seeker. The definition of a “safe third
country” involves more than ensuring non-refoulement. If the U.S. and
Canada are failing to promote systems that welcome asylum seekers by
promoting policies that reduce the quality of access to asylum seekers,
then the ‘safety’ of the U.S. and Canada must come into question.
The mixture of priorities and motivations surrounding STCA
presented by the interview participants suggest that a blurring of the
security, migration and human rights regimes is occurring. These systems
were once very distinct, with different responsibilities and agendas. Now
states present security as an umbrella which is all-encompassing. The
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of the others. Systems are products of state visions. The vision for North
America post 9/11 gazes through a lens of security.
Based on the interview with United States Government
Representative, Sam, I gained a deeper understanding of the U.S.
approach to the border: that a sovereign state has the right to control its
border and that the U.S. has the right to decide who enters. Regardless of
the foundation of this person’s argument for state agency overriding
refugee agency, debating the question of “who chooses the new nation
state” in relation to asylum seekers seems irrelevant when they arrive at
the border in need of protection. Asylum seekers move regardless of the
theoretical support for them. Rather than refusing to process asylum
seekers, the state must develop ways to process these migrant flows in
accordance to its international obligations. Flows of asylum seekers will
not disappear since migration is a means of survival for many. It is in the
interest of the state to develop policies that respond to asylum flows which
are sustainable in the long term.
While states maintain the right to control the borders of their
sovereign territory, it is important to recognize that providing asylum
seekers with the freedom of choice is relevant to the national interests of
states involved. Asylum seekers aim to continue their asylum journeys
until they believe they have reached a safe haven. This raises the
question: why is choice a controversial and thwarted concept in
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short term without estimating the long term forecast. The failure to
forecast is illustrated by interview participants who asked me questions
regarding the value of STCA as a policy. The choices made by asylum
seekers during their journeys for refugee protection speak of the
protection gaps in systems and the potential quality of protection at
system offers. Why are the majority of asylum seekers in North America
aiming to resettle in Canada? How do the “market” forces demonstrate
which system is “safer” or at least perceived to be “safer” by asylum
seekers themselves? Dench made the point that the current policies of
the Canadian and the U.S. governments are short sighted.
Acknowledging the long term interests of refugees should be included in
the policy considerations of the governments.
In addition to physical differences between the U.S. and Canadian
asylum processing systems, the differences in motivations presented by
the interviewees demonstrate that during the course of 2006, Canada and
the U.S. currently have different visions of migration management. The
discrepancies in the answers regarding the expansion of STCA
demonstrate that Canada and the U.S. are not harmonized. Are they
heading in that direction? Is full harmonization sought or attainable? How
are the U.S. and Canada using each other, their relationship to
accomplish their different visions of the sovereign state? These questions
are relevant to the experience of the asylum seeker. The harmonization
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protection offered by the U.S. and Canada. Differences in state visions
will play out at the border where sovereign power is asserted.
Dench mentioned the “North American perimeter” concept and the
harmonization process that is attempting to achieve that ideal of territorial
control. “Canada will not give in completely to the U.S. because of
sovereignty and the strong refugee advocacy community.” However,
these new imaginations of sovereignty may work together to create a wall
around the U.S. and Canada. The outcome of U.S./Canadian border
renegotiations depend on the sovereignty that emerges from these
processes.
Canadian Government Representative, Morgan, when questioned
about the controversy and opposition surrounding STCA in Canada,
responded, “there is a good deal of support, virtually no opposition”. This
representative believes that the argument can be made by the public that
Canada’s system is still “too generous”, demonstrating this Morgan’s
perception that there is space to create even more restrictive policies than
STCA. As demonstrated in previous chapters and by my interviews with
non-governmental organization employees, researchers and asylum
lawyers, there are a number of parties and individuals who oppose STCA.
In the conclusion that follows, I discuss possible steps forward to reduce
the protection gaps caused by STCA.
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STCA is a policy of migration control that redistributes flows of
asylum seekers between the U.S. and Canada. In practice, the regulatory
policy of STCA functions as a policy of exclusion by deterring and
discouraging people to seek sanctuary in North America. During the first
year of implementation, asylum claims made in Canada at the land border
reached a 15 year low. This suggests that persons who wished to seek
asylum in Canada were either processed in the U.S. system or did not
cross the U.S./Canadian border formally. These potential refugees were
deterred by the barrier erected by STCA and resultantly remained
undocumented in the U.S., utilized informal channels of migration to cross
the U.S./Canadian border, or remained in home or transit countries
outside of North America.
Research on the U.S./Canadian border will never be final because
the border is always altering in response to different flows at different
geographical sites. Walters presents a metaphor of anti-virus software
that describes the nature of the new border: “It captures the fact that
immigration control is not a static, once and for all time accomplishment
but a dynamic, strategic affair – a field of tactics and counter-tactics”
(255). States have more agency than they recognize; it is state policy,
among other factors, that feeds the demand for informal migration
strategies. The history of informal cross-border flows developing from
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Country agreements on flows are not unpredictable.
Through the pursuit of this project, I found that there are a number
of silences surrounding STCA. While there are many secondary sources
that discuss the impacts of STCA, as illustrated by chapters 1 and 2, there
is a lack of government released data on the policy that would be useful to
execute a comprehensive evaluation of STCA, which was demonstrated
by my interviews with government employees. Without more information
on STCA, it is difficult to explore the exclusions and protection gaps that
are currently hidden impacts of the policy.
In order to uncover evidence to assess the extent that STCA
functions as an exclusionary policy, the advocacy and international
communities must pressure the U.S. and Canadian governments to
release the following data: the nationalities of asylum seekers whom are
diverted to U.S. and Canada under the application of STCA, the
acceptance rates by nationality of those processed under STCA, the
acceptance rates of persons pursuing gender-based claims, and
information on persons who are exempt and non-exempt on the basis of
the “family” exception of STCA. With this information, researchers could
effectively conduct comparative studies of the protection offered by the
U.S. and Canadian asylum processing systems and evaluate the impacts
of STCA on protection, particularly for specific populations such as
Colombian asylum seekers and those pursuing claims on the grounds of
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Since it may be difficult to encounter the formal data, it would be
valuable for those interacting with persons impacted by STCA to conduct
an informal data gathering. NGOs serve as effective collection sites
because they experience traffic of asylum seekers interacting with or
deterred by STCA. These sites could include NGOs along the
U.S./Canadian border, NGOs in second countries such as Ecuador and
NGOs within the U.S. and Canada that work with asylum seekers.
Information collected by these NGOs would enable researchers to explore
the impacts of STCA on human smuggling and trafficking, to gauge the
number of potential refugees remaining undocumented in the U.S.
because they are deterred by STCA and to assess the deterrent affect of
STCA on asylum seekers in second countries of asylum such as
Colombian asylum seekers in Ecuador.
There are a number of ways to alter STCA in order to improve
access to and the quality of protection in the U.S. and Canada. The U.S.
and Canadian governments could initiate a review of differences in their
systems that may be resulting in protection gaps and begin a process to
close these gaps. The danger with this harmonization process is that it
may result in a lower level of refugee protection in North America. The
advocacy community would need to participate in the harmonization
process in order to pressure the U.S. and Canadian governments to strive
for higher levels of protection. Asylum seekers would benefit from a
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U.S. and Canadian governments with the advocacy communities. Until
protection is improved in the U.S., implementing an exemption from STCA
for asylum seekers who are of nationalities that have historically different
acceptance rates between the U.S. and Canada such as Colombian
asylum seekers would alleviate the diminished or denied protection
experienced by some asylum seekers under STCA.
I have argued that STCA is a policy that is not sustainable in the
long term and that asylum seekers will never achieve the same level of
protection under STCA as they did before the policy’s implementation;
safe third will never be “safe” because the U.S. and Canadian asylum
systems will never be equal. It is in the interest of the U.S. and Canadian
states to reject the concept of safe third and to develop policies that
enable asylum seekers to realize their asylum journeys. Through
consultation with advocacy groups and the international community, the
U.S. and Canada could close protection gaps and improve the quality of
protection offered in North America. By increasing the access to asylum
and the quality of refugee protection in the U.S. and Canadian states,
asylum seekers would make claims in both systems. A balanced flow of
asylum seekers can be achieved without regulatory policies such as
STCA.
Policies of control will never be fully effective in regulating, deterring
or preventing the movement of asylum seekers. The need for safe haven

- 98 persists and those persons in need will continue to move in order to
survive.
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- 104 Appendix 1: Final text of the Safe Third Country Agreement

AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
FOR COOPERATION IN THE EXAMINATION
OF REFUGEE STATUS CLAIMS
FROM NATIONALS OF THIRD COUNTRIES

THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”),
CONSIDERING that Canada is a party to the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva, July 28, 1951 (the “Convention”),
and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York,
January 31, 1967 (the “Protocol”), that the United States is a party to the
Protocol, and reaffirming their obligation to provide protection for refugees
on their territory in accordance with these instruments;
ACKNOWLEDGING in particular the international legal obligations of the
Parties under the principle of non-refoulement set forth in the Convention
and Protocol, as well as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, done at New York,
December 10, 1984 (the “Torture Convention ”) and reaffirming their
mutual obligations to promote and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
RECOGNIZING and respecting the obligations of each Party under its
immigration laws and policies;
EMPHASIZING that the United States and Canada offer generous
systems of refugee protection, recalling both countries’ traditions of
assistance to refugees and displaced persons abroad, consistent with the
principles of international solidarity that underpin the international refugee
protection system, and committed to the notion that cooperation and
burden-sharing with respect to refugee status claimants can be enhanced;

- 105 DESIRING to uphold asylum as an indispensable instrument of the
international protection of refugees, and resolved to strengthen the
integrity of that institution and the public support on which it depends;
NOTING that refugee status claimants may arrive at the Canadian or
United States land border directly from the other Party, territory where
they could have found effective protection;
CONVINCED, in keeping with advice from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its Executive Committee, that
agreements among states may enhance the international protection of
refugees by promoting the orderly handling of asylum applications by the
responsible party and the principle of burden-sharing;
AWARE that such sharing of responsibility must ensure in practice that
persons in need of international protection are identified and that the
possibility of indirect breaches of the fundamental principle of nonrefoulement are avoided, and therefore determined to safeguard for each
refugee status claimant eligible to pursue a refugee status claim who
comes within their jurisdiction, access to a full and fair refugee status
determination procedure as a means to guarantee that the protections of
the Convention, the Protocol, and the Torture Convention are effectively
afforded;
HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1
1. In this Agreement,
a. “Country of Last Presence” means that country, being
either Canada or the United States, in which the refugee
claimant was physically present immediately prior to making
a refugee status claim at a land border port of entry.
b. “Family Member” means the spouse, sons, daughters,
parents, legal guardians, siblings, grandparents,
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews.
c. “Refugee Status Claim” means a request from a person to
the government of either Party for protection consistent with
the Convention or the Protocol, the Torture Convention, or
other protection grounds in accordance with the respective
laws of each Party.
d. “Refugee Status Claimant” means any person who makes
a refugee status claim in the territory of one of the Parties.
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of laws and administrative and judicial practices employed
by each Party’s national government for the purpose of
adjudicating refugees status claims.
f. “Unaccompanied Minor” means an unmarried refugee
status claimant who has not yet reached his or her
eighteenth birthday and does not have a parent or legal
guardian in either Canada or the United States.
2. Each Party shall apply this Agreement in respect of family members
and unaccompanied minors consistent with its national law.

ARTICLE 2
This Agreement does not apply to refugee status claimants who are
citizens of Canada or the United States or who, not having a country of
nationality, are habitual residents of Canada or the United States.

ARTICLE 3
1. In order to ensure that refugee status claimants have access to a
refugee status determination system, the Parties shall not return or
remove a refugee status claimant referred by either Party under the
terms of Article 4 to another country until an adjudication of the
person’s refugee status claim has been made.
2. The Parties shall not remove a refugee status claimant returned to
the country of last presence under the terms of this Agreement to
another country pursuant to any other safe third country agreement
or regulatory designation.

ARTICLE 4
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, the Party of the country of last
presence shall examine, in accordance with its refugee status
determination system, the refugee status claim of any person who
arrives at a land border port of entry on or after the effective date of
this Agreement and makes a refugee status claim.
2. Responsibility for determining the refugee status claim of any
person referred to in paragraph 1 shall rest with the Party of the
receiving country, and not the Party of the country of last presence,
where the receiving Party determines that the person:
a. Has in the territory of the receiving Party at least one family
member who has had a refugee status claim granted or has
been granted lawful status, other than as a visitor, in the
receiving Party’s territory; or
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member who is at least 18 years of age and is not ineligible
to pursue a refugee status claim in the receiving Party’s
refugee status determination system and has such a claim
pending; or
c. Is an unaccompanied minor; or
d. Arrived in the territory of the receiving Party:
i.

With a validly issued visa or other valid admission
document, other than for transit, issued by the
receiving Party; or

ii.

Not being required to obtain a visa by only the
receiving Party.

3. The Party of the country of last presence shall not be required to
accept the return of a refugee status claimant until a final
determination with respect to this Agreement is made by the
receiving Party.
4. Neither Party shall reconsider any decision that an individual
qualifies for an exception under Articles 4 and 6 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 5
In cases involving the removal of a person by one Party in transit through
the territory of the other Party, the Parties agree as follows:
a. Any person being removed from Canada in transit through the
United States, who makes a refugee status claim in the United
States, shall be returned to Canada to have the refugee status
claim examined by and in accordance with the refugee status
determination system of Canada.
b. Any person being removed from the United States in transit through
Canada, who makes a refugee status claim in Canada, and:
i.

whose refugee status claim has been rejected by the United
States, shall be permitted onward movement to the country
to which the person is being removed; or

ii.

who has not had a refugee status claim determined by the
United States, shall be returned to the United States to have
the refugee status claim examined by and in accordance
with the refugee status determination system of the United
States.

ARTICLE 6
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own discretion examine any refugee status claim made to that Party
where it determines that it is in its public interest to do so.

ARTICLE 7
The Parties may:
a. Exchange such information as may be necessary for the effective
implementation of this Agreement subject to national laws and
regulations. This information shall not be disclosed by the Party of
the receiving country except in accordance with its national laws
and regulations. The Parties shall seek to ensure that information is
not exchanged or disclosed in such a way as to place refugee
status claimants or their families at risk in their countries of origin.
b. Exchange on a regular basis information on the laws, regulations
and practices relating to their respective refugee status
determination system.

ARTICLE 8
1. The Parties shall develop standard operating procedures to assist
with the implementation of this Agreement. These procedures shall
include provisions for notification, to the country of last presence, in
advance of the return of any refugee status claimant pursuant to
this Agreement.
2. These procedures shall include mechanisms for resolving
differences respecting the interpretation and implementation of the
terms of this Agreement. Issues which cannot be resolved through
these mechanisms shall be settled through diplomatic channels.
3. The Parties agree to review this Agreement and its implementation.
The first review shall take place not later than 12 months from the
date of entry into force and shall be jointly conducted by
representatives of each Party .The Parties shall invite the UNHCR
to participate in this review. The Parties shall cooperate with
UNHCR in the monitoring of this Agreement and seek input from
non-governmental organizations.

ARTICLE 9
Both Parties shall, upon request, endeavor to assist the other in the
resettlement of persons determined to require protection in appropriate
circumstances .
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ARTICLE 10
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of notes
between the Parties indicating that each has completed the
necessary domestic legal procedures for bringing the Agreement
into force.
2. Either Party may terminate this Agreement upon six months written
notice to the other Party.
3. Either Party may, upon written notice to the other Party, suspend
for a period of up to three months application of this Agreement.
Such suspension may be renewed for additional periods of up to
three months. Either Party may, with the agreement of the other
Party, suspend any part of this Agreement.
4. The Parties may agree on any modification of or addition to this
Agreement in writing. When so agreed, and approved in
accordance with the applicable legal procedures of each Party, a
modification or addition shall constitute an integral part of this
Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their
respective governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Washington D.C., this 5th day of December 2002, in duplicate in
the English and French languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF CANADA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Procedural Issues Associated with
Implementing the Agreement for
Cooperation in the Examination of
Refugee Status Claims from
Nationals of Third Countries
Statement of Principles
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The Parties intend to act according to the following principles:
1. Opportunity for Third Party During Proceedings. Provided no
undue delay results and it does not unduly interfere with the
process, each Party will provide an opportunity for the applicant to
have a person of his or her own choosing present at appropriate
points during proceedings related to the Agreement. Details
concerning access to proceedings will be set out in operational
procedures.
2. Proof of Family Relationship. Procedures will acknowledge that
the burden of proof is on the applicant to satisfy the decision-maker
that a family relationship exists and that the relative in question has
the required status. Credible testimony may be sufficient to satisfy a
decision-maker in the absence of documentary evidence or
computer records. It may be appropriate in these circumstances to
request that the applicant and the relative provide sworn
statements attesting to their family relationship.
3. Standard for Determining Eligibility for an Exception to the
Agreement. The United States will use the preponderance of
evidence standard to determine whether an applicant qualifies for
an exception under the Agreement. Canada will use the balance of
probabilities standard to determine whether an applicant qualifies
for an exception under the Agreement. These standards are
functionally equivalent.
4. Review. Each Party will ensure that its procedures provide, at a
minimum: (1) an opportunity for the applicant to understand the
basis for the proposed determination; (2) an opportunity for the
applicant to provide corrections or additional relevant information,
provided it does not unduly delay the process; and (3) an
opportunity for the applicant to have a separate decision-maker,
who was not involved in preparing the proposed determination,
review any proposed determination before it is finally made.
5. Record of Interview and Eligibility Determination. Upon request
and subject to national law, Canada and the United States will
share all written materials pertaining to whether an applicant
qualifies for an exception under the Agreement. Subject to national
law, this information will also be available to the applicant.
6. Requests to Reconsider Exception Determinations. Each Party
will have the discretion to request reconsideration of a decision by
either Party to deny an applicant’s request for an exception under
the Agreement should new information, or information that has not
previously been considered, come to light.
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will reconsider any decision that an applicant qualifies for an
exception under the Agreement.
8. Timeframe for Return Under the Agreement. Returns to the
country of last presence under the Agreement must take place
within 90 days after the original refugee status claim is made.
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What were the motivations for the signing of STCA?
What is your impression on Canadian/U.S. harmonization?
Is harmonization occurring?
How is the experience of refugees at the border changing and how is it
related to the policy changes?
What is the forecast for the permanence of the STCA policy and the
impacts of its implementation?

